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Abstract
This is an empirical analysis of the so-called Northeast Atlantic Mackerel
Dispute between coastal nations such as the EU, Norway, the Faroe Islands
and Iceland. In this thesis, firstly, we discuss the relevant biological and
managerial aspects of Northeast Atlantic Mackerel. Then we begin to give
a full factual depiction of the dispute. Based on the historical accounts of
the dispute, we define the research problems of the issue. Further, we lay
out the theoretical basis for solving such problems, i.e., fishery economics
and game theory. By applying the theoretical framework and adopting the
bioeconomic model, we solve the problems with extensive discussion and
sensitivity analysis. The solution we find for the Mackerel Dispute is that
all coastal nations should cooperate because such cooperation would lead to
more NPV, recruitment and escapement levels of the mackerel stock but less
harvest collectively. However, only with a proper benefit sharing arrange-
ment, such cooperation may be feasible, resulting in each individual player
end up with more benefit than acting on its own.
Keywords : Bioeconomics, Game Theory, Golden Rule, Northeast Atlantic
Mackerel, Mackerel Dispute, Profit Allocation, Stock-recruitment.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Objective and structure of the thesis
This is an empirical study on the recent heated so-called Mackerel Dispute
between Iceland as one party and the coalition formed by the European Union
(EU), Norway, and the Faroe Islands. In the very beginning of the thesis, we
present the main objective and a description of the structure of the thesis.
The main objective of the thesis is to employ bioeconomics as well as game
theory to numerically analyse and solve the mackerel issue. In order to
better serve such aim, we structure the thesis as follows. In Chapter 1, we
introduce the background of the case from biological, historical and the status
quo perspectives. The content of mackerel biological aspects we introduce
are confined to the relevance and understanding of the problem. Standing
upon the knowledge background of the case, research problems are defined
in Chapter 2. In order to answer the research questions, in Chapter 3, we lay
out both of fishery economics and game theory as our theoretical framework.
Then in Chapter 4, extending from the theoretical basis paved out in Chapter
3, the bioeconomic model we adopt is introduced. Extensive mathematical
formulation are involved and presented in this process. So far, we have all the
background knowledge and tools to enable us to solve the research questions
proposed in Chapter 2. Therefore, in Chapter 5, we estimate the parameters
of the bioeconomic model and solve the problems under two scenarios, i.e., the
1
SNF Report No. 06/15
cooperative and non-cooperative. Based on the theoretical guiding principles
introduced in Chapter 3, on the collective level, cooperation is almost and
always more desirable than non-cooperation. However, there are conditions
for the viability of cooperation. In Chapter 6, we apply game theory to
test the conditions for viability of the cooperation. Due to the limitations
embodied in the estimates of some parameters in the bioeconomic model,
sensitivity analysis is performed in Chapter 7 to make the findings of the
thesis more comprehensive. Extensive discussions are involved in Chapter
5, 6 and 7. In Chapter 8, we conclude based on the results we obtain and
discuss the limitations and possibilities of the model.
1.2 Biological traits and the environment
1.2.1 Taxonomy and definition
The name of mackerel is a colloquial fish term and it can be referred to a
number of pelagic, swift-moving, and streamlined food and sport fishes (En-
cyclopaedia Britannica). Therefore, the term of mackerel does not refer to
one single species or even one genus in the strict sense of scientific classifi-
cation. It consists of many species across a number of genera. It could be
mostly but not exclusively traced back to the family Scombridae, which is
also the family that tuna (tribe Thunnini) belongs to.
The mackerel that this thesis deals with is a special single species called At-
lantic Mackerel, Scomber scombrus (Figure 1.1). The geographic range of
this species is widely spread in Atlantic: from Labrador to Cape Lookout,
U.S. in the western Atlantic; and from Iceland to Mauritania in the eastern
Atlantic, including the southwestern Baltic Sea, the Mediterranean Sea and
the Black Sea (Figure 1.2).
As can be seen from Figure 1.2, the habitats of the western and eastern At-
lantic stocks are depicted separately without geographic linkage. Further,
no evidence has been found that there is cross-Atlantic migration of the two
separate stocks in previous studies (Jansen and Gislason, 2013).
2
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Figure 1.1: Atlantic Mackerel, Scomber scombrus (Goode, 1884).
Figure 1.2: The biogeographic distribution range of Atlantic Mackerel
(IUCN).
3
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This thesis is written to specifically address the issues of Atlantic Mackerel
that lives in the Northeast of Atlantic, of which the management and util-
isation cause conflicts of coastal nations such as the EU, Norway, Iceland,
the Faroe Islands, termed as the Mackerel Dispute/Issue, sometimes labelled
as “Mackerel War” in the mass media. Thus, the biogeographic location is
added to the name of the species to more precisely reflect the fish stock, i.e.,
Northeast Atlantic (NEA) Mackerel.
Also, NEA Mackerel is defined by International Council for the Exploration
of the Sea (ICES) as “the (Atlantic) Mackerel present in the area extending
from the Iberian peninsula in the south to the northern Norwegian Sea in
the north, and Iceland in the west to the western Baltic Sea in east” (ICES,
2014b).
NEA Mackerel is the mackerel stock we are referring to throughout the thesis.
1.2.2 Age and growth
Atlantic Mackerel could grow to a maximum length of more than 60 cm
(Muus and Nielsen, 1999) and have an extreme weight of 3.4 kg (Frimodt,
1995). Table 1.1 shows International Bottom Trawl Survey (IBTS) estimates
of length, weight and proportion of catch by age (%) for NEA mackerel both
in the North Sea and the NEA as a whole (ICES, 2005). The average length
and proportion of the matured mackerel at age obtained in IBTS surveys are
illustrated in Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4, based on IBTS data from year 2000
to 2004.
Maturity estimates for NEA Mackerel as a whole indicate that more than
half are mature at age 2, with 100% maturity at age 7 (Reid et al., 2001),
despite the fact that in Figure 2, IBTS data indicate that in the North Sea
more than 90% have reached maturity at age 2.
The longevity is estimated to be approximately 12 years for the western
Atlantic stock (Gregoire, 1993) and 18 years for the eastern Atlantic stock
(Villamor et al., 2001).
4
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Mackerel  Scomber scombrus  Family Scombridae  
Table 1. Estimates of length (cm), weight (g) and proportion of catch at numbers by age (%) for mackerel in the North Sea, and for
the North East Atlantic as a whole [adapted from 8]. 
Length Weight Proportion of catch 
Age IV NEA IV NEA IV NEA 
0 23.4 22.0 103 81 1 1 
1 27.4 27.7 166 170 18 11 
2 31.2 31.5 257 269 17 16 
3 34.2 33.8 357 337 6 5 
4 35.2 35.1 404 388 14 17 
5 34.7 36.6 388 440 13 14 
6 34.5 37.4 385 478 13 11 
7 37.6 38.5 503 525 6 8 
8 39.6 39.6 612 576 3 6 
9 40.1 40.3 617 617 2 4 
10 41.0 40.7 669 637 2 3 
11 40.8 41.1 639 654 1 2 
12 42.4 41.5 708 685 1 1 
13 41.0 42.0 651 731 1 <1 
14 42.3 42.4 708 744 1 <1 
15 40.8 43.2 671 780 1 <1 
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Figure 2. Mean length (left) and proportion mature (right) at age for mackerel in the North Sea and Skagerrak/Kattegat, based on 
IBTS data 2000 2004 
Reproduction: Mackerel are batch spawners, females shedding their eggs in some twenty batches during the
course of the spawning season [10]. The maximum number of ripe eggs for a 30 cm specimen is about 
255,000 [10], which, assuming a weight of 200 g [2], is equivalent to 1,275 eggs per gram body weight. 
Maturity estimates for North-east Atlantic mackerel as a whole indicate that more than half are mature at age 
2, with 100% maturity at age 7 [7], although IBTS data indicate that in the North Sea more than 90% have
reached maturity at age 2 (Fig. 2). Mackerel spawn between May and July [2,11]. Spawning areas have been
variable in the past, but are mainly situated in the central North Sea, with extensions along the southern coast
of Norway and in the Skagerrak [12,13]. In 2005, eggs were distributed in a broad band running obliquely 
from the north English coast to the Norwegian Deeps (Fig. 3) [14]. 
Figure 1.3: The mean length for NEA Mackerel at age in the North Sea and
Skagerrak/Kattegat (ICES, 2005).
Mackerel  Scomber scombrus  Family Scombridae  
Table 1. Estimates of length (cm), weight (g) and proportion of catch at numbers by age (%) for mackerel in the North Sea, and for
the North East Atlantic as a whole [adapted from 8]. 
Length Weight Proportion of catch 
Age IV NEA IV NEA IV NEA 
0 23.4 22.0 103 81 1 1 
1 27.4 27.7 166 170 18 11 
2 31.2 31.5 257 269 17 16 
3 34.2 33.8 357 337 6 5 
4 35.2 35.1 404 388 14 17 
5 34.7 36.6 388 440 13 14 
6 34.5 37.4 385 478 13 11 
7 37.6 38.5 503 525 6 8 
8 39.6 39.6 612 576 3 6 
9 40.1 40.3 617 617 2 4 
10 41.0 40.7 669 637 2 3 
11 40.8 41.1 639 654 1 2 
12 42.4 41.5 708 685 1 1 
13 41.0 42.0 651 731 1 <1 
14 42.3 42.4 708 744 1 <1 
15 40.8 43.2 671 780 1 <1 
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Figure 2. Mean length (left) and proportion mature (right) at age for mackerel in the North Sea and Skagerrak/Kattegat, based on 
IBTS data 2000 2004 
Reproduction: Mackerel are batch spawners, females shedding their eggs in some twenty batches during the
course of the spawning season [10]. The maximum number of ripe eggs for a 30 cm specimen is about 
255,000 [10], which, assuming a weight of 200 g [2], is equivalent to 1,275 eggs per gram body weight. 
Maturity estimates for North-east Atlantic mackerel as a whole indicate that more than half are mature at age 
2, with 100% maturity at age 7 [7], although IBTS data indicate that in the North Sea more than 90% have
reached maturity at age 2 (Fig. 2). Mackerel spawn between May and July [2,11]. Spawning areas have been
variable in the past, but are mainly situated in the central North Sea, with extensions along the southern coast
of Norway and in the Skagerrak [12,13]. In 2005, eggs were distributed in a broad band running obliquely 
from the north English coast to the Norwegian Deeps (Fig. 3) [14]. 
Figure 1.4: The proportion of the matured NEA Mackerel at age in the North
Sea and Skagerrak/Kattegat (ICES, 2005).
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Table 1.1: Estimates of length (cm), weight (g) and proportion of catch by
age (%) for NEA Mackerel in the North Sea and NEA as a whole (ICES,
2005).
Length (cm) Weight (g) Proportion of catch (%)
Age
North
Sea
NEA
North
Sea
NEA
North
Sea
NEA
0 23.4 22.0 103 81 1 1
1 27.4 27.7 166 170 18 11
2 31.2 31.5 257 269 17 16
3 34.2 33.8 357 337 6 5
4 35.2 35.1 404 388 14 17
5 34.7 36.6 388 440 13 14
6 34.5 37.4 385 478 13 11
7 37.6 38.5 503 525 6 8
8 39.6 39.6 612 576 3 6
9 40.1 40.3 617 617 2 4
10 41.0 40.7 669 637 2 3
11 40.8 41.1 639 654 1 2
12 42.4 41.5 708 685 1 1
13 41.0 42.0 651 731 1 <1
14 42.3 42.4 708 744 1 <1
15 40.8 43.2 671 780 1 <1
1.2.3 Habitat
Atlantic Mackerel is a pelagic fish that lives in the sea and ocean. The depth
of its living zone can range from zero to one thousand metres, literally from
the near bottom of the ocean to the surface of the sea. However, the usual
depth of its habitat is from 0 to 200 metres (Collette and Nauen, 1983).
Also, Atlantic Mackerel prefers to live in cold and temperate water and shelf
areas, at above 5◦C. It is sensitive to changes in water temperature as well.
When water temperatures ranges between 11◦ and 14◦C, Atlantic Mackerel
moves closer to shore in spring to spawn.
The feeds of Atlantic Mackerel are mainly zooplankton, crustaceans and small
fish. Also, Atlantic Mackerel can be a very opportunistic predator. From one
6
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year to another, they may seek any available oceanic areas and exploit them
for feeds (Langøy et al., 2012). In the winter time, not only due to insufficient
food but also to the fact that most fish stay throughout winter in deep water
on the bottom, Atlantic Mackerel fast.
Atlantic Mackerel is a kind of forage fish, which means that it acts as the
bait for larger predators. It is an important food resource for various pelagic
predators, such as sharks and marine mammals. The youth Atlantic Mackerel
can also be eaten by the mature ones.
1.2.4 Spatial-temporal distribution and migration
NEA Mackerel is widespread throughout the NEA. It comprises three spawn-
ing components, namely, the Western component, the Southern component
and the North Sea component (ICES, 2013). Although in reality, the struc-
ture of the stock is probably more complicated than a clear-cut division into
the three components (ICES, 2014a; Jansen and Gislason, 2013). Since year
1995, all the three spawning components of NEA Mackerel are evaluated as
one stock (Marine Institute, 2009), despite the fact that recent studies have
challenged on this stance (Uriarte et al., 2001).
In all the three spawning components, the Western component is the largest,
accounting for approximately 75% of the entire NEA Mackerel stock; whereas
the Southern component accounts for approximately 22% of the stock. The
North Sea component is identified as a separate spawning component with
an extremely low level of population since the early 1970s, which amounts to
around 3% of the total stock (ICES, 2014a).
Although mackerel landings of each component cannot be attributed specifi-
cally to spawning area on biological basis, by convention, ICES separates and
distributes the components according to the areas where mackerel is caught.
The areas for mackerel and spawning area distribution are presented in Table
1.2 (ICES, 2014a). Also, as a complement to Table 1.2, Figure 1.5 illustrates
the ICES division of the NEA.
7
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Table 1.2: Distribtuion for NEA Mackerel and main spawning components
(ICES, 2014a).
Distribution of NEA Mackerel
ICES Subareas and Divisions: IIa, IIIa, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IXa, and XIV
Distribution of main spawning areas
Western Southern North Sea
VI, VII, VIIIa,b,d,e VIIIc, IXa IV, IIIa
Figure 1.5: ICES division of the NEA.
8
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The sustained swimming speed of Atlantic Mackerel is up to 3.5 body lengths
per second, which is equivalent to approximately 4 km/h for a 30 cm mackerel
(Wardle and He, 1988). It has once been observed that one tagged specimen
of the Western stock had travelled approximately 1,200 km in 13 days (Col-
lette, 1986). Such sustained speed and long distance travelling capabilities
could support Atlantic Mackerel seasonal migration for spawning, feeding
and overwinter purposes (Molloy, 2004).
Since Atlantic Mackerel does not have a swim bladder, it has to swim con-
stantly, otherwise it would sink. Also, Atlantic Mackerel is a typical shoaling
fish, that is, when the mackerel migrates, it travels in groups. It has been
reported that they school with large shoals of up to 9 km long, 4 km wide,
and 40 m deep (Lockwood, 1988).
The migration pattern of NEA Mackerel can be divided into two elements,
i.e., a pre-spawning migration and a post-spawning migration (ICES, 2014a).
From late summer to autumn, the pre-spawning migration starts from the
feeding grounds in the North and Nordic seas. The Western and Southern
components mix with the North Sea component and overwinter in deep wa-
ter along the edge of the continental shelf, for example, to the north and
east of Shetland and along the edge of the Norwegian Trench. When spring
comes, the Western component travels southwest along the western Scottish
and Irish coasts, mixing with the Southern component, and then spawn in an
area stretching from the north of Hebrides to the Bay of Biscay (Simmonds,
2001; Popescu and Poulsen, 2012).
When spawning is finished, the post-spawning migration starts. The Western
Mackerel travels back to the feeding grounds in the northern North Sea and
Norwegian Sea, returning to the beginning of the migration pattern. Figure
1.6 depicts the major migration pattern until the 2000s of the Western com-
ponent.
It should be noticed that the migration pattern of the mackerel has been
subject to substantial change through time and has not been fully under-
stood by scientists (ICES, 2014a). It can be seen from Figure 1.6 that, the
9
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Figure 1.6: The major migration pattern of the Western component until
the 2000s. The dark paths show the pre-spawning migration patterns. The
thin dark line illustrates the migration pattern in the late 1970s; whereas the
thick line shows the pattern in the 1990s. The light path represents the track
of the post-spawning migration (Reid et al., 1997).
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pre-spawning migration pattern in the 1990s (the thick dark line) had been
moved more offshore than in the 1970s (the thin dark line). Additionally,
more dramatic change in migration pattern has taken place in the recent
decade due to climate change.
1.2.5 Climate change and impact on NEA Mackerel
Originated from the Gulf Stream, the North Atlantic Current is a warm ocean
current that continues to the northeast. One of the two major branches of
the current continues going north along the coast of northwestern Europe,
e.g., the United Kingdom (UK), the Scandinavian nations, Iceland and etc.
Scientists generally agree that the North Atlantic Current has a significant
warming impact on the climate of northwest Europe and the surrounding
waters (Seager et al., 2002). Yet the North Atlantic Current and the local
waters of northwestern Europe seem to have been becoming even warmer,
believed by many scientists that climate change is the cause.
According to Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution, species have adapted
to and evolved for certain climate conditions in their habitats. When the
temperatures are rising in short-term in their habitats, one possible way for
species to adapt is to move away towards the poles of the Earth, where the
temperature would have been lower without climate change; yet with climate
change, the temperature is adjusted for. This is known as the poleward shift
(IPCC, 2007). Recently, marine ecologists from University of Queensland
found that the “leading edge or ‘front line’ of marine species distribution is
moving towards the poles at an average rate of 72 km per decade” (Poloczan-
ska et al., 2013).
NEA Mackerel follows this trend but in a much more extreme way. A decade
of years ago, Atlantic Mackerel had not been observed in the waters of Ice-
land. Only until recently, they had been found from time to time in the
Icelandic waters. The increased presence of mackerels in certain seasons has
been related to a warmer marine climate (Astthorsson et al., 2012; Jonsson
and Palsson, 2006).
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This could also be caused by the presence and abundance of the feeds of NEA
Mackerel such as zooplankton, crustaceans and etc., due to climate change as
well. A striking example revealed by Continuous Plankton Recorder survey
that has been operating since 1931 shows that, the assemblages of a small
crustacean as typical feed of NEA Mackerel, and copepod assemblages (the
southern shelf edge assemblage and pseudo-oceanic assemblage) have moved
more than 1,100 km polewards over the past 50 years (Beaugrand et al.,
2002; Richardson et al., 2006).
Such explanations of the migration pattern change of mackerel are also con-
cluded by ICES. According to ICES, the geographical distributional change
of NEA Mackerel may be related to increased water temperature, and may
reflect changes in food availability, and/or increased stock size (ICES, 2014b).
Due to the possible reasons, recently, in the warm periods, NEA Mackerel has
migrated farther westwards and northwards in the eastern Atlantic during
the summer feeding migration (ICES, 2009). Both of the distribution and the
abundance of NEA Mackerel in Icelandic waters have increased gradually.
1.3 Management and fishery
1.3.1 Management regime
According to the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (formally, the
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Con-
servation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks), straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks are to
be managed by Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs).
RFMO consists of Coastal States and relevant Distant Water Fishing States
(Bjørndal and Munro, 2003; Bjørndal and Ekerhovd, 2014). A Coastal State
is a state where a migrating fish stock enters and is found in its exclusive
economic zone (EEZ).
The United Nations defines straddling fish stocks as “stocks of fish such as
12
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pollock, which migrate between, or occur in both, the EEZ of one or more
states and the high seas” (ICES, 2008). In the NEA, Atlantic Mackerel is also
a typical straddling stock that is exploited both within the EEZs of Coastal
States and on the high seas.
In the NEA, the relevant RFMO is represented by the North East Atlantic
Fisheries Commission (NEAFC). Founded in 1980, NEAFC is established
by the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in Northeast Atlantic
Fisheries, which was put into force in 1982. Figure 1.7 illustrates the Con-
vention Area and Regulatory Area of NEAFC.5/26/2015 neafc-ra-map-web-version.png (460×468)
http://www.neafc.org/system/files/neafc-ra-map-web-version.png 1/1
Figure 1.7: NEAFC Convention Area: within the red boarder line; NEAFC
Regulatory Area: comprised of high sea block areas in orange colour: the
Reykjanes Ridge, the “Banana Hole” of the Norwegian Sea, the Barents Sea
“Loophole” and the north-polar area (NEAFC).
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NEAFC is formed up of delegations from Contracting Parties. Contracting
Parties are Denmark (representing the Faroe Islands and Greenland), the
EU, Iceland, Norway and the Russian Federation.
In 1982, a 200 nautical-mile exclusive zone stretching from the baseline of a
Coastal State was recognised as the EEZ by the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, applicable to any UN Member States, over which
the Coastal State has special rights regarding the exploration and use of ma-
rine resources, including energy production from water and wind (UN, 1982).
Figure 1.8 illustrates the relationship between EEZ and territory waters as
well as other related maritime concepts of a Coastal State. Figure 1.9 depicts
the EEZ of Coastal States in the NEA region.
As can be seen from Figure 1.8, the first 12 nautical miles of EEZ overlap
with the territory waters of the Coastal State, over which the state has full
sovereignty. The area beyond the territory waters but within the EEZ is part
of international waters, where the sovereign right to use is conferred to the
Coastal State.
Since the 200 nautical mile of EEZs of was put into place in 1982, most
of the fish stocks would have been regulated by NEAFC became national
zones where national jurisdiction effects. Therefore, according to NEAFC,
the management of straddling fish stocks became a matter of bilateral or
multilateral responsibility. NEAFC recognises that it does not possess real
power or responsibility to manage the fish stocks in the NEA.
However, NEAFC still serves as a forum for consultation and the exchange of
information on fish stocks and management for Coastal States. It also makes
recommendations concerning fisheries in international waters in the Conven-
tion Area. Advised by ICES, NEAFC makes recommendations of measures
such as total allowable catch (TAC) of each fish species in order to maintain
the rational exploitation of fish stocks in the Regulatory Area.
ICES is a global research organisation. According to its official website, it
aims to provide the “best available science for decision-makers to make in-
14
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Figure 1.8: Relationship between EEZ and territory waters as well as other
maritime concepts of a Coastal State.
formed choices on the sustainable use of the marine environment and ecosys-
tems”. ICES has 20 member states from both sides of north Atlantic.
Due to the fact of the so-called Mackerel Dispute/Issue (which is detailed in
a later section of the chapter), there has been no consensus by all Coastal
States on the management and TAC. In October 2008, a management plan
that evaluated by ICES and concluded as precautionary was agreed by Nor-
way, the Faroe Islands, and the EU (ICES, 2008). However, since 2009, there
has been no internationally agreed annual TAC, which causes instability and
conflicts of Atlantic Mackerel fishing in this region.
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Fisheries management in the Northeast Atlantic
I Types of internationally
shared fish stocks.
I Transboundary fish
stocks migrate between
the exclusive economic
zones (EEZ) of two or
more coastal states
I ‘Straddling’ fish stocks
migrate between the
EEZ of one or more
coastal states and the
high seas
I Highly migratory fish
stocks are confined to
the remaining high sea
Figure 1.9: EEZs of Coastal States in the NEA region: water territories
within the 200 nautical mile from the baseline of Coastal States. Note that
the areas of high seas on the map hollowed out from the blue coloured ocean
are identical to the orange blocks depicted in Figure 1.7, which is also NEAFC
Regulatory Area.
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1.3.2 Fishing stock and fishery
Historically, the landings of the Western component were low in the 1960s,
but have picked up since and become the most abundant and largest source
of the catches. The Southern component is the second largest source of land-
ings, taking around 10% of the total catch.
The North Sea component had experienced heavy exploitation in the late
1960s with landings peaked in 1967 for approximately 1 million tonnes (Popescu
and Poulsen, 2012). This lead to the collapse of the North Sea component
and catches have reduced significantly since then. It is estimated that in
the last decade, the annual catches were only about 10,000 tonnes (Popescu
and Poulsen, 2012). At present, protective measures have been applied to
the North Sea component for more than two decades, e.g., targeted fishing is
banned in the North Sea. Yet the North Sea component has failed to recover
and remained depleted since the 1970s.
Since 2002, the spawning stock biomass (SSB) of Atlantic Mackerel has in-
creased. In 2009, ICES recognised the full reproductive capacity status for
the stock. However, for the time being, the stock of Atlantic Mackerel is still
over exploited, as the total actual catches are still beyond the recommended
TAC set by ICES under precautionary principle.
NEA Mackerel is exploited according to its geographical distribution and
migratory patterns throughout the year. According to ICES, large fisheries
are stretched out from the western and northern coasts of Iberia Peninsular,
through the Bay of Biscay, as well as the South, West and North of the UK
and Ireland, into the northern North Sea and the Norwegian Sea. In the most
recent years, NEA Mackerel fishery industry has expanded northwestwards
into Icelandic and east Greenland waters (ICES, 2014a).
A variety of techniques have been employed by different nations based upon
both of the national fleet structure and the behaviour of NEA Mackerel
(ICES, 2014b). During the time when mackerels overwinter in the North
Sea, they are targeted by large Norwegian purse seiners. As mentioned in
17
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previous section in this chapter, migration for spawning starts when spring
comes. NEA Mackerel travels from the northern North Sea in large shoals to
the west first and then move down south along the west coasts of Scotland
and Ireland. In this period of time, they are hunted primarily by pelagic
trawlers fleets of Scotland and Ireland.
During the spawning season, NEA Mackerel is targeted by the Spanish fleet
consisting of both trawlers and a large number of artisanal fishing boats.
When spawning season is finished, NEA Mackerel travels northwards for
feeding grounds. Pelagic fleets from Russia, Iceland, the Faroe Islands and
Greenland join in the hunting activities for mackerels.
The South West Mackerel Box (also referred to as the Cornwall Box), which
is off the southwest coast of England, was created to protect juvenile mack-
erel population. Only smaller scale handliners are permitted to fish in this
area (ICES, 2014a).
1.4 Conflicts over fishing
1.4.1 Background and economic significance
Back in the 1970s, Atlantic Mackerel had an image problem in the UK. For
a long period of time, people believed that mackerel was a scavenger. Once,
there was even folklore telling that mackerel fed on the dead body of sailors.
At that time, it was very difficult for the majority of British people to change
their mind or diet, being reluctant to depart from more established fish such
as cod, haddock or salmon (British Sea Fishing).
However, since the 1990s, the acceptance of Atlantic Mackerel has been in-
creasing for a number of reasons. Firstly, nutrient-wise it has very low mer-
cury but high omega 3 fatty acid, containing nearly twice as much omega
3 per unit weight as does salmon, with a flavour that appeals to some con-
sumers. Also there are many ways to preserve as well as to consume Atlantic
Mackerel. It is traded fresh, refrigerated, smoked or canned; and can be eaten
fried, broiled or baked (Frimodt, 1995). Finally, since Atlantic Mackerel is
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pelagic therefore it can be harvested by the fishing gears without destroying
the seabed ecology, fitting the choice of eco-conscious consumers. The pop-
ularity of this oceanic resource has created a great economic value.
Also, as discussed in previous sections of this chapter, the climate change has
lead to warmer ocean waters in the North Atlantic, which possibly increased
the presence of mackerels northwestwards in the waters of Iceland and the
Faroe Islands. The Faroe Islands is a self-governing country within the Dan-
ish Realm yet not part of the EU.
Parallel to the change of migration patterns of NEA Mackerel, in the late
of year 2008, triggered by international financial crisis unfolded in 2007 and
2008, all three major Icelandic private commercial banks faced difficulties in
refinancing their short-term debts and bank runs, due to the increased per-
ceived risk of Icelandic banking system. It was estimated that relative to the
size of its economy, the banking system meltdown in Iceland was the largest
experienced crisis by any state in economic history (The Economist, 2008).
The financial crisis led to a severe economic depression from year 2008 to
2010 and huge political instability (IMF, 2015).
Additionally, labelled “the ocean cluster” in recent years, fisheries and related
sectors are the single most important component of the economy of Iceland,
contributing 27.1% of its gross domestic product (GDP) in year 2011 , with
more than 40 percent of foreign currency earned from exported goods com-
ing from the export of fish products according to the Icelandic Ministry of
Industries and Innovation. It is arguable that all the factors mentioned may
cause Iceland to start to have an increasing mackerel quota (IOC, 2011).
To the Faroe Islands, the fishing sector is even more important than that of
Iceland. Traditionally, the Faroe Islands has been heavily dependent on fish-
ing activities. The fishing sector normally accounts for about 95% of exports
and approximately half of the GDP. Starting from early 2008, the economy
of the Faroe Islands began to slow down due to lower amount of fish landings
and high oil prices in historical records (CIA, 2014).
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The UK has been a traditional major stakeholder in the EU for harvesting
NEA Mackerels, taking more than half of the total catch of EU every year.
Moreover, the fishing industrial sector in Scotland takes up a great propor-
tion of the whole fishing industry in the UK. A recent inquiry conducted
by the Royal Society of Edinburgh (RSE) found that fishing activities yield
much greater social, economic and cultural importance to Scotland than it
is relative to the rest of the UK (RSE, 2004).
Scotland has just 8.4% of the UK population but the landings of fish at its
ports account for over 60% of the total catch in the UK. Many of fishing
communities in relatively remote areas such as Fraserburgh, Kinlochbervie
or Lerwick are scattered along an extensive coastline. For centuries, these
communities have seen fishing as the main source of living and employment
(RSE, 2004).
Also, restrictions imposed under the Common Fisheries Policy by the EU
affect all EU Member States fishing fleets, but they have particularly limited
the Scottish fishing industry in recent years for the demersal or whitefish sec-
tor (boats mainly fishing for cod, haddock and whiting), making production
capacity of pelagic trawlers fleet idle (RSE, 2004).
On the total level of the EU mackerel fisheries, a 2013 study shows that about
800 EU vessels have a strong economic dependence on Atlantic Mackerel, by
which more than 39% of the value of the total catch of a fleet segment were
harvested. These vessels maintain over 1,630 jobs and create more than 45
million euros gross added value (Weissenberger, 2013).
Similar to Scotland, the fishery sector has always played a key social and
economic role in Norway, both nationally and regionally. It has provided the
basis for settlement and employment along the Norwegian coast (FAO). The
various degrees of economic dependence on mackerel fishing of all the Coastal
States provide historical background and incentives of the confrontation over
mackerel fishing, which is described in the next section.
20
SNF Report No. 06/15
1.4.2 Confrontation and disputes
It has been pointed out that Iceland has a history of conflict with its Euro-
pean neighbours over fishing rights in the North Atlantic waters. The Cod
Wars is one of classic examples. During the 1950s and 1970s, the UK and
Iceland had a series of confrontations in regard to fishing rights in the North
Atlantic, and it is referred to as the Cod Wars. In 1976, the conflict ended
with Iceland victory in the sense that the UK recognised the 200 nautical-
mile exclusive fishery zone of Iceland (Gilchrist, 1978).
Its latest confrontation has brought Iceland against other Coastal States such
as the EU, Norway and the Faroe Islands, over the amount of Atlantic Mack-
erel to catch. Such confrontation has been named as Mackerel Dispute/Issue.
In the mass media, it is not surprising to see such dispute to be labelled as
Mackerel War. The brief history of the Mackerel Dispute is described as
follows.
Since 1999, under the forum provided by NEAFC, Iceland had requested to
be recognised as a Coastal State for the management of Atlantic Mackerel
fishing. However, such proposal was not accepted by the other three Coastal
States, the EU, Norway and the Faroe Islands, as Iceland was not historically
a mackerel-fishing nation.
Denied to be a participant in the discussion held in NEAFC on Atlantic
Mackerel TAC share, the negotiations between Iceland and other Coastal
States could not really open up. Without approval of the other three coastal
nations, Icelandic fishing fleets began fishing Atlantic Mackerel at increas-
ingly large quantities in 2006.
In the end of October 2007, the EU, Norway and the Faroe Islands agreed on
long-term management plans for Atlantic Mackerel fishing, advised by ICES.
The TAC for mackerel agreed upon for year 2008 amounts to 456,000 tonnes,
a reduction of 9% of current TAC (European Commission, 2007).
Starting from 2008, the Government of Iceland began to unilaterally set quo-
tas for Atlantic Mackerel fishing (Ministry of Industries and Innovation of
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Iceland). The Icelandic quota for Atlantic Mackerel in 2008 amounted to ap-
proximately 112,000 tonnes, up from merely 4,000 tonnes in 2006 and 36,500
tonnes in 2007 (Fiskistofa).
During the Costal States consultation rounds held in 2009, citing the north-
westwards shift in Atlantic Mackerel summer feeding migration and abun-
dant presence of Atlantic Mackerel in its EEZ during that period, Iceland
requested a large share of catch. Iceland continued to declare a unilateral
mackerel quota of 112,000 tonnes for year 2009, which caused the EU to ex-
press its “serious concern”. The EU regarded Iceland’s unilateral action had
neither historical or scientific basis (European Commission, 2009a).
During the same consultation rounds, the Faroe Islands followed in turn
(Weissenberger, 2013). It also demanded a higher share of the resource. The
consultation rounds ended with the withdrawal of the Faroe Islands from the
previously agreed long term management plan with the EU and Norway.
In the end of 2009, the EU and Norway were not able to have a mutually
satisfactory mackerel quota arrangement for year 2010 (European Commis-
sion, 2009b). However, the two parties reached a resolution in the beginning
of the next year (European Commission, 2010).
Situation was aggravated by the unilateral declarations of mackerel quotas of
Iceland and the Faroe Islands. Iceland increased the TAC to 130,000 tonnes
for year 2010, significantly higher than the 2,000 tonnes allotted to it by
NEAFC. By pointing to its denied participation to quota negotiations with
the other stakeholders and a fast increasing amount of mackerel within its
EEZ, Iceland defended this decision. The Faroe Islands also levelled up its
quota for its own fleets at 85,000 tonnes for year 2010, which was approx-
imately three times of its previous share. In retaliation, Norway banned
landings from Icelandic and Faroese ships in Norwegian ports (FAO Globe-
fish, 2011).
Shortly after the announcement of its TAC, Iceland received invitation and
was recognised as a Coastal State for mackerel fishing by the EU, Norway
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Table 1.3: The TAC and share set for Atlantic Mackerel agreed in the 5-year
arrangement by the EU, Norway and the Faroe Islands (European Commis-
sion, 2014b).
Country TAC (tonnes) Share (%)
EU 519,512 49.3
Norway 237,250 22.5
Faroe Islands 132,814 12.6
Reserve 164,424 15.6
Total 1,054,000 100
and the Faroe Islands.
During five rounds of consultations that happened between autumn 2011 and
early 2012, three series of proposals submitted by the EU and Norway were
rejected by Iceland and the Faroe Islands (European Commission, 2012).
In the autumn of 2013, Iceland and the EU had reached a mutual understand-
ing on allocation to Iceland, acceptable by both states, recognising Iceland’s
demand of at least 11.9% of the TAC. However, not all of the Coastal States
could agree on this share for Iceland. Negotiation failed again (Ministry of
Industries and Innovation of Iceland).
In March 2014, three of the Coastal States, the EU, Norway and the Faroe
Islands signed a 5-year arrangement which Iceland was not a party of. Eu-
ropean Commissioner for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Maria Damanaki
referred the signing date of the landmark deal as to a significant day for in-
ternational fisheries (European Commission, 2014a). According to the 5-year
arrangement, the TAC and share set for Atlantic Mackerel is presented at
Table 1.3.
Until the completion of the thesis, no significant improvement has made upon
the 5-year arrangement of the three coastal nations for all the interest par-
ties. Iceland has still not agreed on the TAC and its share with the other
three Coastal States. Table 1.4 summarises the brief history of Mackerel
Dispute/Issue. Complementing to the national/regional TACs mentioned in
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the above paragraphs, Table 1.5 shows the actual catches of different nations
in the NEA region from 2001 to 2013 according to ICES (ICES, 2014b).
As can be seen from Table 1.5, over the decade, the total catch has seen
a major decrease until around 2006 to 449,700 tonnes then a significant in-
crease in recent years, from 666,800 in 2001 to 923,700 tonnes in 2013.
In 2001, the EU and Norway took up approximately 90% of the total catches
of mackerel, amounting to approximately 63% and 27% respectively. How-
ever, both of their relative shares have kept decreasing dramatically because
of the impact brought by the fishing activities of Iceland and the Faroe
Islands. As a result, in 2013, the relative shares of the EU and Norway
accounted for around 36% and 18% respectively, aggregated to 54%. The
amount of harvest in absolute terms for both the EU and Norway changed
from approximately 600,000 tonnes in 2001 to approximately 500,000 tonnes
in 2013. While, catches of Iceland and the Faroe Islands have grown from al-
most zero percent to approximately 17% and 16% in year 2013, respectively.
The UK remains the largest stakeholder of the EU, representing almost half
of the catches of the EU throughout the years. The share of Russia has re-
mained relatively stable, ranging from approximately 6% to 9% in the decade.
In 2013, Greenland had its unprecedented catch of mackerel, amounting to
52,800 tonnes, which account for almost 6% of the total catch.
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Chapter 2
Research problem
Based on the historical facts and discussions presented in Chapter 1, the
interest parties of NEA Mackerel fishing can be divided into two distinct
players, i.e., Iceland (hereinafter referred to as “Player 1”) and the Coalition
consisting of the EU, Norway and the Faroe Islands (hereinafter referred to
as “Player 2”). The essence of the dispute is that one party does not agree
with the TAC and its share set by the other party, for instance, Iceland has
continuously been disputing on the TAC and its share set by the EU, Norway
and the Faroe Islands.
Recognising such political reality as well as the given facts and data, we want
to know how much should each player harvest in its own best interest. To
clarify this proposition, we formulate such problem into questions in order to
address them accurately. In order to see the viability of cooperation between
Player 1 and Player 2, we need to compare the outcomes of two scenarios,
namely, cooperative scenario vs. non-cooperative scenario.
• First, in the cooperative scenario, what is the financial benefit, the effects
on mackerel stock levels and the amount of harvest?
• Second, in the non-cooperative scenario, what is the financial benefit of
each player acting in its own best interest? And what are the effects on
mackerel stock levels and the amount of harvest?
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Intuitively, one of the criteria for players to cooperate is that each player
benefits from cooperation. In other words, each player ends up with more
value of catch than it acts on each own and competes with each other. And
this leads to a greater total value of catch. This is the very foundation
allowing cooperation to exist. We propose the two questions above so that
we are able to know if the financial benefit under cooperation is greater
than the aggregated financial benefit of the two players without cooperation.
However, another condition for the viability of cooperation is that, each
player cannot financially worsen off from cooperating. Therefore, we propose
the research question below.
• Third, given the argument as above, assuming the financial benefit under
cooperation is large enough for cooperation to exist, what should each
player’s share of the financial benefit be?
The three bulleted questions are the research problem the thesis is trying to
address. In Chapter 3, we layout the theoretic basis for solving the research
problem.
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Chapter 3
Theoretical basis
3.1 Fishery economics
Natural fish stock is a typical common good as it has both rivalrous and non-
excludable nature. In economics, a good is rivalrous when the consumption
of such good by one person precludes its consumption by another; whereas
exclusivity means that it is possible to stop a person who have not paid for
it from having access to it.
The rivalrous nature of common fish stock results in externality as well. That
is, the catch of one extra unit of the fish stock by one person results in one
extra unit less for others to fish. Therefore, without management and regu-
lation, fishery stock in public waters such as lakes, rivers or oceans cannot
prevent people from accessing and racing to catch it. This is referred to as
“open access” case in the context of fishery. Such individual rationale accord-
ing to each self’s interest usually behaves in contrary to the best interests of
the whole group and always result in over-exploitation and non-sustainability,
i.e., overfishing and stock collapse in the fishery case. Such phenomenon is
denoted as tragedy of the commons by American ecologist Garrett Hardin
(1968). By management and regulation, individual fisherman acts under co-
ordination towards collective interest as a single owner of the stock, and this
is referred to as the “sole-owner” case in fishery management.
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In economics, to correct the market failure resulted from open access to a
common resource, government intervention such as management and regula-
tion is needed. There are several approaches to deal with the issue such as
privatisation, access limit and etc. In the case of fishery, the task of sustain-
able utilisation of fishery stock lies in the notion of fishery management.
FAO defines the goals of fishery management in normative terms, that is,
it should be based on political objectives with transparent priorities (FAO,
2009). Here is a shortlist of political objectives when exploiting a fish re-
source:
• Maximise sustainable biomass yield (or maximum sustainable yield in
short, MSY)
• Maximise sustainable economic yield (or maximum economic yield, MEY)
• Secure and increase employment
• Secure protein production and food supplies
• Increase export income
Nevertheless, it should be noted that such political goals can conflict with
each other (Duzgunes and Erdogan, 2008).
In the thesis, to answer the research questions, we are most interested in MSY
and MEY. According to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD), MSY is the largest long-term average catch or yield that
can be taken from a stock under prevailing ecological and environmental con-
ditions. The concept of MSY aims to keep the stock size at maximum growth
rate by catching the reproduced amount of fish that would be introduced to
the stock in order to let the stock continue to reproduce at maximum growth
rate indefinitely. MEY is reached by maximising the difference between total
revenue and total cost. In other words, where marginal revenue is equal to
marginal cost. To work out MSY and MEY, bioeconomic modelling which
establishes a mathematical relationship between fishing activities (harvest)
and the change of the stock size, can be adopted. The bioeconomic model
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we adopt for the case in the thesis is presented in Chapter 4.
Though MSY and MEY can be calculated based on bioeconomic models
and used to make informed decisions, precautionary principle should also be
taken into account in decision-making process. In a general sense, the pre-
cautionary principle suggests that when an action or policy could potentially
cause harm, it should not be act upon unless it can be scientifically proven
to be safe. Specific to fishery management, FAO advises that the precau-
tionary principle should be applied when “ecosystem resilience and human
impact are difficult to forecast and hard to distinguish from natural changes”
(Cochrane and Garcia, 2009).
To implement fishery management policies, there are broadly three types of
management, under which many techniques are potentially useful. The man-
agement techniques are summarised in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Fishery management techniques.
Output/Harvest Input/Effort Economic incentive
Total allowable catch Licence Tax
Individual catch quotas Vessel characteristica Subsidy
Individual transferable quotas Time restriction
Marine reserves
Different types of management techniques under each management category
have both advantages and disadvantages and aim to achieve different objec-
tives. The principles of the management techniques are not the focus of the
thesis and a description of NEA fishery management regime of the case is
given in Chapter 1.
3.2 Game theoretic perspective
As discussed in previous section, to correct the market failure caused by open
access to a common fish stock that leads to over-exploitation, it requires gov-
ernment intervention. However, in the case of straddling fish stock such as
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Atlantic Mackerel, there is no “international government” which has superior
political power over the sovereignty of Coastal States. Therefore, to effec-
tively manage a common fish stock, international cooperation is needed. In
the context of game theory, we refer the sole-owner case to as cooperation.
There are two issues that involve in the problem of cooperation: building
the coalition and sharing benefits (bearing losses or costs). Based on game
theoretic analysis, a stable coalition of cooperative management regime can
only be established under certain circumstances. The most crucial condition
is referred to as the rationality condition, which asserts that for individual
players, the payoff from cooperation must be at least as great as under non-
cooperation. For instance, each player cannot worsen off from cooperating,
which also leads to a greater or equal benefit than the aggregated individual
total benefit without cooperation.
However, how to split the benefits affects the payoff of individual players.
Several guiding principles of sharing benefits are available such as: egalitar-
ian method, altruistic method, Shapley value and etc.
As the name tells, egalitarian method splits the benefits based on the egalitar-
ian principle, i.e., to share the benefit equally among the players. Altruistic
allocation asserts that the share of each player under cooperation should be
equal to each stand-alone benefit over the total sum of the stand-alone ben-
efit. Shapley value is a method that captures the importance of each player
contribution to the coalition. The mathematical formulations of all three
different methods are presented in Chapter 6.
However, under cooperation, by a benefit allocation method, if the benefit of
one player is worsened off comparing to its stand-alone benefit and results in a
loser-winner situation, side payment can be introduced. If such side payment
paid out by the winner can potentially make the loser financially indifferent
whether joining the coalition or not, yet still make the winner better off than
standing alone, then such side payment increase the scope for bargaining.
Also, it enhances the flexibility and the resilience of the cooperation.
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3.3 Literature review
As discussed in previous section of this chapter, MSY aims to keep the stock
size at maximum growth rate by catching the largest reproduced amount so
that to maintain the stock sustainable in the long term. Such mechanism
of managing fish stock has traditionally become a main objective of fishery
management. The 1950s has seen the most of MSY’s popularity in history
(Larkin, 1977). In 1958, it was established by UN Conference on the Law of
the Sea that MSY serves as the basic objective in fisheries management (Mar-
dle et al., 2002). Later on, numerous regional fisheries management organisa-
tions as well as individual countries adopted MSY as a primary management
goal (Mace, 2001). FAO also granted considerable support and emphasis to
fishery management based on MSY (Punt and Smith, 2001; Hoshino, 2010).
However, in the literature, the appropriateness and effectiveness of setting
MSY as an management objective was challenged in 1970s (Gulland and
Boerema, 1973; Doubleday, 1976; Beddington and May, 1977; Larkin, 1977;
Sissenwine 1978). Among other things, one of the disadvantages of imple-
menting fishery management based on MSY is misleading and undesirable
from economic point of view. Scott Gordon argued that to maximise re-
source rent, the optimal allocation of fishing effort to a fishery would occur
at the point at which marginal cost equals marginal revenue, which is the
MEY (Gordon, 1954). As at MEY, the size of fishery stock that produces
the largest discounted economic profit is normally greater than the stock size
of generating MSY. Such argument has been repeatedly demonstrated in the
literature (Clark, 1990; Grafton et al., 2007). In the recent decades, MEY
has gained more attention in the literature and among policy makers. It was
even argued by Dichmont et al. (2010) that fisheries management has been
experiencing “a paradigm shift from a focus on managing the resource to a
focus on managing resource users” (Hoshino, 2010).
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Chapter 4
Bioeconomic model
According to the theoretical framework discussed in Chapter 3, a bioeco-
nomic model needs to be adopted to capture the essential properties of NEA
Mackerel. The size of NEA Mackerel stock is subject to change. The major
forces contributing to this change are its biological expansion, mortality and
human fishing activities. These processes are highly dynamic and interre-
lated to each other, such that cannot be encompassed by simple continuous
time models. Also, as presented in Chapter 1, the fishable stock of NEA
Mackerel may only occur several years after the spawning of the existing
adult population. Moreover, the entire life history of mackerel and other
organisms is generally subject to strong seasonal or period influences such as
reproduction, migration and so on (Clark, 1990; Clark, 2010).
To avoid to model such complicated biological dynamics, in simplified terms,
that is, to ignore the biological inter-relationship between mackerel birth,
growth and death happening simultaneously to the stock, the population
change of NEA Mackerel can be related only to the variable of time, that is,
a lumped parameter model. It can further be conceptualised that, there are
time cycles, between which the population size at one cycle is a function of
the population size at the previous cycle, such as:
xt+1 = f(xt)
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where x denotes the mackerel stock at t-th cycle. Such model is called
discrete-time metered model (Clark, 1990). However, within each cycle we
take human fishing activities into account. To specifically address the mack-
erel case, our bioeconomic model for NEA Mackerel is
Rt+1 = F (St), t = 0, 1, 2, . . . (4.0.1)
St = Rt −Ht, S0 given (4.0.2)
where Rt denotes recruitment in cycle t. Recruitment is the amount of ma-
ture fish population, which is ideally subject to human fishing activities. Ht
is the harvest or specifically referred to as fish landed (landings) in the fishery
context, which is the amount of catches taken from the recruitment. Deduct-
ing harvest from recruitment, what is left in the fish stock is referred to as
escapement, St, which constitutes the spawning population, being potentially
the birth-givers for the stock in the next period. Figure 4.1 illustrates the
relationship between recruitment, harvest and escapement in discrete time
cycles. In the thesis, time cycles (periods) are defined as years because NEA
Mackerel spawns once a year as introduced in Chapter 1.
The function F (·) captures the relationship between escapement and recruit-
ment between the cycles. It is also named as the spawner-recruit or stock-
recruitment relationship according to fishery economics literature (Clark,
1990). The stock-recruitment function that we adopt is the one proposed
by Ricker in 1954 and can be written as
F (S) = aSe−bS (4.0.3)
where a is the recruitment per unit of escapement and b describes how recruit-
ment levels decline with increasing escapement levels (Paz and Larraneta,
1992). Also, this model has the property of overcompensation, which means
that a high escapement level results in a decline in recruitment level for the
next period. We believe that this property of Ricker’s model captures the
cannibalistic behaviour of NEA Mackerel as described in Chapter 1. Figure
4.2 is the graphical illustration of Ricker’s model.
35
SNF Report No. 06/15
Recruitmentt
Harvestt Escapementt Recruitmentt+1
Harvestt+1 Escapementt+1 . . . 
Time cycle t
Time cycle t+1
Figure 4.1: Graphical illustration of the discrete-time metered model.
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Figure 4.2: Graphical illustration of Ricker’s stock-recruitment model.
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As can be seen from Figure 4.2, MSY is reached when the first order deriva-
tive of the stock-recruitment function is equal to one, F ′(SMSY ) = 1, which
maximises the vertical distance F (S) − S between the recruitment curve
R = F (S) and the replacement line R = S (Clark, 2010). Point S = K
is the equilibrium of an unexploited stock, which is termed as the carrying
capacity of the stock. The point SMEY is the escapement level reached when
the discounted perpetual economic profit is maximised, i.e., MEY is reached.
MEY escapement level SMEY always lies in between the MSY escapement
level SMSY and the carrying capacity K.
Also, from Equation 4.0.2 it can be seen that human fishing activities are
incorporated within each cycle; whereas the biological properties of mackerel,
such as birth, growth and death, are manifested as the parameters a and b
of the Ricker’s model in Equation 4.0.3, which cause the changes of mackerel
stock sizes from one cycle to another in Equation 4.0.1. Combining all the
concepts discussed above, the bioeconomic model we adopt is an aggregated
biomass lumped parameter stock-recruitment model.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Player 1, namely Iceland, competes for mackerel
resource in the NEA with Player 2, the coalition consisting of the EU, Nor-
way and the Faroe Islands. In the next sections of this chapter, we further
detail our mathematical analysis into two scenarios respectively: cooperative
and non-cooperative.
4.1 Cooperative scenario
Since the bioeconomic model we adopt is complicated, under this section
we present and discuss the mathematical concepts and components of the
bioeconomic model separately.
Net present value
Harvest is the amount of mackerel caught, yielding economic value. In this
scenario, it is in the best interest of all interest parties to collaborate together
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and to maximise the net present value (NPV) of the future mackerel landings.
NPV is defined as the discounted future cash flows of net profit earned from
mackerel landings:
NPV =
∞∑
t=0
γtΠ(t)
where γ is the discount factor and Π(t) is the net profit of time cycle t.
Discount factor
If Kt is the future payment of K0 in a discrete time period t, compounded
with interest rate represented by r, then
Kt = (1 + r)
tK0 ⇔
K0 =
1
(1 + r)t
Kt ⇔
K0 =
(
1
1 + r
)t
Kt ⇔
K0 = γ
tKt
where γ is the discount factor, expressed as
γ =
1
1 + r
Net profit function
Net profit from mackerel landings for a given period t can be expressed as
the difference between total revenue TR earned from selling landed mackerels
and the total cost TC associated to effort inputs of harvesting the mackerels,
such as number of vessels. Therefore, it can be written as:
Π(t) = TRt − TCt (4.1.1)
where total revenue is the price p of mackerel times the amount of mackerel
landings, for instance,
TRt = pHt (4.1.2)
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and here, we assume total cost is proportionate with effort E
TCt = cEt (4.1.3)
where c is the cost parameter, expressed as cost in monetary terms per unit
of effort.
Harvest and effort
Here we specify the harvest production function as
Ht = qEtxt (4.1.4)
where E is predefined as fishing effort, i.e., number of vessels, x is the size of
mackerel stock at time t and q is a catchability coefficient, which represents
the share of mackerel landings H from mackerel stock x by one standard
vessel within time cycle t. For the remaining of the thesis, we define the
catchability coefficient to be identical to one, i.e., q ≡ 1, therefore Equation
4.1.4 becomes
Ht = Etxt
By doing so, we need to change the way we measure fishing effort. Fishing
effort E is likely to change within each time cycle, thus for any t-th cycle
E =
t∫
0
E(τ)dτ (4.1.5)
where τ = 0 is the beginning of the time cycle and τ = t is the end. The stock
x(τ) at τ = 0 is the recruitment, x(0) = R, and at τ = t the escapement,
x(t) = S. Also, for the duration of the time cycle the change of the stock is
the harvest, meaning that
dx
dτ
= −E(τ)x(τ), 0≤τ≤t
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Figure 4.3: Graphical illustration of the relationship between recruitment,
escapement and harvest within a time cycle.
or equivalently
E(τ) = − 1
x(τ)
dx
dτ
(4.1.6)
Figure 4.3 illustrates such process.
Substituting Equation 4.1.6 in 4.1.5, we obtain
E =
t∫
0
E(τ)dτ =
t∫
0
− 1
x(τ)
dx
dτ
dτ
=
x(t)∫
x(0)
−1
x
dx =
S∫
R
−1
x
dx
=
R∫
S
1
x
dx =
[
ln(x)
]R
S
40
SNF Report No. 06/15
or equivalently
E = ln
(
R
S
)
(4.1.7)
It can be seen from the Equation 4.1.7 that for any given time cycle fish-
ing effort is equal to the natural logarithm of the ratio of recruitment and
escapement. Therefore, the general form of Equation 4.1.7 for t-th cycle is
Et = ln
(
Rt
St
)
(4.1.8)
NPV maximisation
As discussed previously in the cooperation scenario, all interest parties are
bound to collaborate together, aiming to maximise the NPV of their mackerel
landings over infinite future periods. Before jumping into the maximisation
problem immediately, we need to substitute and rearrange the mathematical
formulation of the NPV in steps.
First, we need to obtain the total cost TCt as a function of recruitment Rt
and harvest Ht, therefore we substitute Equation 4.1.8 into Equation 4.1.3,
and obtain
TCt = cEt = c·ln
(
Rt
St
)
or equivalently
TC(Rt, Ht) = c·ln
(
Rt
Rt −Ht
)
(4.1.9)
since escapement S of period t has already been defined as the difference
between harvest H and recruitment R of period t. Equation 4.1.9 can also
be expressed as
TC(Rt, Ht) =
Rt∫
Rt−Ht
c
x
dx (4.1.10)
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Second, we substitute Equation 4.1.10 and 4.1.2 into Equation 4.1.1, and we
obtain net profit as a function of recruitment and harvest
Π(Rt, Ht) = pHt −
Rt∫
Rt−Ht
c
x
dx (4.1.11)
Now we can mathematically formulate the maximisation problem. The objec-
tive function NPV can be expressed as a function of recruitment and harvest.
However, such problem is constrained by the stock-recruitment relationship.
Overall, it can be presented as follows:
maximise
Ht
∞∑
t=0
γtΠ(Rt, Ht)
subject to Rt+1 = F (Rt −Ht)
0 ≤ Ht ≤ Rt
(4.1.12)
To unfold the maximisation problem, we re-write Equation 4.1.11 as follows:
Π(Rt, Ht) = pHt −
Rt∫
Rt−Ht
c
x
dx
=
Rt∫
Rt−Ht
(p− c
x
)dx (4.1.13)
because harvest is the change of the stock size from recruitment to escape-
ment. Next, we define the marginal net profit pi(x) as
pi(x) = p− c
x
where x is the stock size. Assuming that φ(x) is the antiderivative of pi(x)
we can express Equation 4.1.13 as below:
Π(Rt, Ht) =
Rt∫
Rt−Ht
pi(x)dx =
[
pi(x)
]Rt
Rt−Ht
= φ(Rt)− φ(Rt −Ht)
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where
φ′(x) = pi(x)
Therefore
NPV =
∞∑
t=0
γt(φ(Rt)− φ(Rt −Ht)) (4.1.14)
Using the stock-recruitment constraint Rt = F (Rt−1−Ht−1) for t≥1, we have
∞∑
t=0
γtφ(Rt) = φ(R0) +
∞∑
t=1
γtφ(F (Rt−1 −Ht−1))
= φ(R0) +
∞∑
t=0
γt+1φ(F (Rt −Ht))
Finally, combining the equation above with Equation 4.1.14, we obtain
NPV = φ(R0) +
∞∑
t=0
γt+1φ(F (Rt −Ht))−
∞∑
t=0
γt(φ(Rt −Ht))
= φ(R0) +
∞∑
t=0
γt[γ · φ(F (St))− φ(St)]
Now we are enabled to set out the optimal harvest strategy, namely, to choose
the escapement level St for each time cycle t = 0, 1, 2, . . . by maximising
γ · φ(F (St))− φ(St)
If St = S
∗ maximises this expression, the optimal strategy is given by
H0 = R0 − S∗
Ht = F (S
∗)− S∗ for t ≥ 1
that is, for the initial period the harvest is the difference of the initial re-
cruitment subtracted by optimal escapement; for the remaining periods the
optimal steady state is reached, where the optimal harvest is the difference of
the optimal recruitment deducted by optimal escapement. This immediate
approach to steady state is referred to the bang-bang approach with equilib-
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rium escapement S∗ (Clark, 2010). Since φ′(x) = pi(x), by taking the first
order derivative and equate it to zero, we obtain
[γ · φ(F (S∗))− φ(S∗)]′ = 0⇔
γ · φ′(F (S∗))·F ′(S∗)− φ′(S∗) = 0⇔
γ · pi(F (S∗))F ′(S∗) = pi(S∗)
or equivalently
F ′(S∗)
pi(F (S∗))
pi(S∗)
=
1
γ
(4.1.15)
This formula is called the Golden Rule. The Golden Rule points to an eco-
nomically optimal equilibrium escapement level S∗ (Clark, 2010).
4.2 Non-cooperative scenario
In the non-cooperative scenario, each player acts on its own, aiming to max-
imise its own NPV, which is potentially detrimental to other players. For
this case, as previously defined in Chapter 2, there are only two players in-
volved, i.e., Iceland as Player 1 and the coalition of EU, Norway and the
Faroe Islands as Player 2.
To simplify the issue of mackerel presence in different EEZ of the Coastal
States as well as in the international waters during different seasons, we ig-
nore the fact that NEA Mackerel travels through the high seas. That is,
they reside either in the EEZ of Player 1 or in the EEZ of Player 2 and never
appear in the international waters. This is a fair assumption according to
Chapter 1 because the size of the international water territory where NEA
Mackerel potentially travels through is relatively small and remote (the “Ba-
nana Hole” of the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea “Loophole” in Figure
1.7), compared to the rest habitat of NEA Mackerel. Please be reminded
that such simplification does not change the common goods nature of NEA
Mackerel due to its migratory behaviour.
To simply ration the mackerel stock between the players, we introduce a pa-
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rameter θi that defines the share of NEA Mackerel stock that only appears
in the EEZ of Player i for a whole year. Since in the case of the thesis, there
are only two players, therefore θ2 = 1 − θ1. Parameter θ consists of two di-
mensions, i.e., time and space. For the dimension of time, based on Chapter
1, it is known that mostly during the summer season, NEA Mackerel travels
northwestwards to feeding grounds and appear in Icelandic waters. This is
when Icelandic fishermen most actively engage in fishing mackerels. Also, for
the spatial dimension, for now let us assume approximately half of the total
mackerel stock appears in the Icelandic waters during the summer feeding
season. Therefore, the portion of NEA Mackerel that Iceland could poten-
tially harvest during a year is θ1 = 1/4 × 1/2 = 1/8 or 12.5%. Therefore,
Player 2 can enjoy the rest portion of the stock for the same year, that is,
θ2 = 1−θ1 = 87.5%. However, please note that such θi estimates may not be
a true representation of the reality because mackerel migration patterns are
highly dynamic and difficult to measure and also subject to change from year
to year. To overcome such problem, sensitivity analysis for θ is performed in
Chapter 7.
As discussed in Chapter 1, though NEA Mackerel is a straddling fish stock,
that is, it migrates through more than one EEZ, the stock-recruitment rela-
tionship still holds for the aggregated population level, that is, Rt+1 = F (St).
With the introduction of θi, within one cycle, we are enabled to work out
the share of the recruitment Ri for each player, Ri = θiR. After mackerel
harvesting activities Hi performed by both players, the escapement of the
fish from EEZ of each player Si can be calculated and combined in the end
of the cycle, Si = Ri −Hi, S =
2∑
i=1
Si. Through the stock-recruitment rela-
tionship on the aggregated stock level, total recruitment for the next cycle
is determined by the total escapement of the current cycle. Then, cycle t
repeats. Figure 4.4 illustrates this process.
Given the fact that one of the two players knows the TAC (an approximation
of actual harvest) of its counterpart, depending on who announces the TAC
first. If the knowing player believes in the stock-recruitment relationship
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Rt
R1t=θ1Rt H1t
R2t=θ2Rt H2t
S1t
S2t
St Rt+1=F(St) . . .
Figure 4.4: Graphical illustration of the stock-recruitment relationship in the
non-cooperative scenario.
specified in the thesis, then the knowing player can maximise its own NPV
by determining its own escapement, given the fact that it knows the TAC
therefore the escapement of its counterpart (Si = Ri − Hi). In reality, the
timing of announcing TAC is subject to administrative demand, policy im-
plementation and other practical issues. Also, TAC is usually announced one
year before the fishing year. If each player has such agenda of maximising
its own NPV based on the harvest of the other player, each player would
most likely to calculate its own TAC based on the predicted harvest of the
counterpart, i.e., the previous year’s actual harvest of the counterpart. That
is to say, each player would rather not wait the announcement of the TAC of
its counterpart for next fishing year but acts on the other player’s historical
harvest. In the thesis, since the Golden Rule solves for the escapement S
and determines the harvest H, therefore the optimal strategy for each player
mentioned as above is expressed in the escapement level Si rather than the
harvest level Hi. And such strategy is named as optimal escapement strategy
for both of the players. Such maximisation problem can be formulated as
follows:
maximise
Hit
∞∑
t=0
γtΠ(Rit, Sit)
subject to Hit = Rit − Sit
St =
2∑
i=1
Sit
Rt+1 = F (St)
Rit = θiRt
0 ≤ Hit ≤ Rit
(4.2.1)
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The underlying assumption of this maximisation problem is that harvest of
the counterpart will not change in the future and so is the escapement level.
However, if both counterparts implement the same maximisation strategy,
each counterpart’s harvest is likely to change. Therefore, such self-NPV-
maximisation would only hold temporarily for one cycle because the other
player will react based on the new information, generated by its counterpart.
Such dynamic problem repeats for n periods until steady-state is reached.
To make it clear, here we adopt mathematical notation as example to clarify
what we have discussed above. Initially, i.e., t = 0, Player 1 determines its
own optimal escapement strategy S∗1,0 based on the prediction that Player
2 will harvest the same amount as last cycle, therefore the escapement S2,0
of Player 2 can be known by Player 1. In the next cycle, t = 1, Player 2 is
enabled to determine its own optimal escapement strategy S∗2,1 also based on
the prediction that Player 1 will harvest the same as last cycle, t = 0, thus
the escapement S1,1 of Player 1 is known to Player 2. This process repeats
for n periods until no player can further change its harvest amount in order
to increase its NPV, resulting in steady-state.
Having defined the individual player’s NPV maximisation problem as well
as how each player will reach to its own optimal escapement strategy S∗i we
can derive the Golden Rule for the above maximisation problem.
The cost function of player i is specified similar to the cost function in the
cooperative scenario:
TC(Rit, Sit) = ci·ln
(
Rit
Sit
)
which can also be expressed as
TC(Rit, Sit) =
Rit∫
Sit
ci
xi
dxi
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the mathematical proof for deriving the cost function of each player is similar
to the one demonstrated in the cooperative scenario.
The net profit of each player can be written similarly to the one in the
cooperative scenario as well:
Π(Rit, Sit) = pHit −
Rit∫
Sit
ci
xi
dxi
=
Rit∫
Sit
(p− ci
xi
)dxi
where again,
pi(xi) = p− ci
xi
pi(xi) is the marginal net profit of player i when the stock is at x. Assuming
that φ(xi) is the antiderivative of pi(xi), we can express the net profit of
player i as
Π(Rit, Sit) =
Rit∫
Sit
pi(xi)dxi =
[
pi(xi)
]Rit
Sit
= φ(Rit)− φ(Sit)
where
φ′(xi) = pi(xi)
Therefore,
NPVi =
∞∑
t=0
γt(φ(Rit)− φ(Sit)) (4.2.2)
Using the constraint of the recruitment of player i, Rit = θiF (St−1) for t≥1,
we have
∞∑
t=0
γtφ(Rit) = φ(Ri0) +
∞∑
t=1
γtφ(θiF (St−1))
= φ(Ri0) +
∞∑
t=0
γt+1φ(θiF (St))
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Finally, combining the equation above with Equation 4.2.2, we obtain
NPV = φ(Ri0) +
∞∑
t=0
γt+1φ(θiF (St))−
∞∑
t=0
γt(φ(Sit))
= φ(Ri0) +
∞∑
t=0
γt[γ · φ(θiF (St))− φ(Sit)]
Now player i is enabled to set out the optimal escapement strategy given
the assumption that its counterpart will retain its previous cycle escapement
strategy, namely, player i to choose the escapement level Sit for each time
cycle t = 0, 1, 2, . . . by maximising
γ · φ(θiF (St))− φ(Sit)
given the fact that the escapement of the counterpart is constant and known.
If Sit = S
∗
i maximises this expression, the optimal strategy is given by
Hi0 = Ri0 − S∗i
Hit = θiF (S)− S∗i for t ≥ 1
that is, for the initial period the harvest of player i is the difference of the
initial recruitment of player i minus the optimal escapement of player i; for
the remaining periods the optimal steady state is reached, where the optimal
harvest of player i is the difference of the optimal recruitment of player i
deducted by optimal escapement of player i. Please keep in mind that such
optimal steady state will occur as long as the counterpart will not react to
player’s i optimal escapement S∗i by adjusting its own optimal escapement.
Since φ′(xi) = pi(xi), by taking the first order derivative and equate it to
zero, we obtain
[γ · φ(θiF (S))− φ(S∗i )]′ = 0⇔
γ · φ′(θiF (S))θi∂F (S)
∂S∗i
− φ′(S∗i ) = 0⇔
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γ · pi(θiF (S))θi∂F (S)
∂S∗i
= pi(S∗i ) (4.2.3)
It can be proved that the partial derivative of the Ricker stock-recruitment
function with respect to the escapement of player i, ∂F (S)/∂Si, is equal to
the derivative of Ricker’s function with respect to total escapement, F ′(S).
To demonstrate the proving process, first we calculate the first order deriva-
tive of Ricker’s stock-recruitment function as follows:
F ′(S) = (aSe−bS)′ = ae−bS + aSe−bS(−b) = ae−bS(1− bS)
Then, we calculate the partial derivative of Ricker’s stock-recruitment func-
tion with respect to the escapement of Player 1, yet the process is the same
for Player 2.
∂F (S)
∂S1
=
∂[a(S1 + S2)e
−b(S1+S2)]
∂S1
= ae−b(S1+S2) + a(S1 + S2)e−b(S1+S2)(−b)
Since S = S1 + S2, the equation above can be expressed as
∂F (S)
∂S1
= ae−bS − baSe−bS = ae−bS(1− bS) = F ′(S)
Therefore, expression 4.2.3 can be written as:
θiF
′(S)
pi(θiF (S))
pi(S∗i )
=
1
γ
(4.2.4)
This formula is the Golden Rule for the non-cooperative scenario and points
to an optimal escapement level S∗i for player i given the fact that its counter-
part will not change its escapement level. The economic optimal equilibrium
escapement for both players is achieved after solving such Golden Rule for n
times.
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Chapter 5
Empirical analysis and solution
5.1 Parameter estimation
In Chapter 4, we define the bioeconomic model and derive the Golden Rule for
the cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios. Now we are to calculate the
optimal escapement strategy for those two scenarios based on our estimations
for the parameters of our bioeconomic model.
In order to be able to solve both Golden Rules under the cooperative and
non-cooperative scenarios, several parameters need to be estimated, namely:
• p, price
• r, discount rate
• a and b, Ricker’s stock-recruitment function parameters
• cost parameters
– c for the cooperative scenario
– c1 for the non-cooperative scenario: Player 1 (Iceland)
– c2 for the non-cooperative scenario: Player 2 (the EU, Norway and the
Faroe Islands)
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Price and discount rate
For the price of mackerel, according to historical data the prices have roughly
centred around 10 Norwegian kroner per kilogram (NOK/kg), plus or minus
a couple of NOKs. For simplicity of the case, we assume the price is constant
at 10 NOK/kg throughout the thesis.
Since, fishery stock is a long-term perpetual asset, the comparable bench-
mark discount rate would be the Norwegian 30-year bond yield, which is
approximately at 2.5% per annum. Allowing some room for economic rent,
we assume that the discount rate is 5% and remain constant.
Ricker stock-recruitment function
In order to capture the relationship between recruitment and escapement, as
discussed in Chapter 4, Ricker’s stock-recruitment function is adopted:
Rt = aSt−1e−bSt−1 (5.1.1)
Such function is a non-linear, therefore in order to estimate parameter a and
b, linearisation is needed. To do so we take the natural logarithm for both
sides of the Equation 5.1.1, and we have
ln(Rt) = ln(aSt−1e−bSt−1) ⇔
ln(Rt) = ln(a) + ln(St−1) + ln(e−bSt−1) ⇔
ln(Rt)− ln(St−1) = ln(a)− bSt−1 ⇔
ln
(
Rt
St−1
)
= ln(a)− bSt−1 (5.1.2)
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is used to estimate parameter a and
b in Equation 5.1.2. In the regression process, the data used are described
as follows. In Chapter 4, recruitment R is defined as the total biomass of
all adult fish in the beginning of the time cycle and escapement S as the
remaining biomass of all adult fish at the end of the time cycle. According
to ICES, SSB is defined as the total weight of all sexually mature fish in the
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Table 5.1: NEA Mackerel SSB and landings in thousand tonnes, as reported
by ICES (ICES, 2014b), the escapement is taken as the difference between
the two variables.
Year SSB Landings Escapement
1980 3,965 735 3,230
1981 3,595 754 2,841
1982 3,584 717 2,867
1983 3,894 672 3,222
1984 4,139 642 3,497
1985 4,053 614 3,439
1986 3,624 602 3,021
1987 3,638 655 2,983
1988 3,580 680 2,900
1989 3,332 586 2,746
1990 3,362 626 2,736
1991 3,214 676 2,538
1992 2,856 761 2,096
1993 2,506 825 1,681
1994 2,169 819 1,350
1995 2,152 756 1,396
1996 2,057 563 1,494
1997 2,049 573 1,476
1998 2,053 666 1,387
1999 2,233 640 1,593
2000 2,176 739 1,437
2001 2,033 737 1,295
2002 1,899 771 1,128
2003 1,916 679 1,237
2004 2,362 660 1,701
2005 2,274 550 1,724
2006 2,263 481 1,781
2007 2,451 586 1,865
2008 3,039 623 2,416
2009 3,682 738 2,944
2010 3,969 876 3,093
2011 4,515 947 3,569
2012 4,181 892 3,288
2013 4,299 932 3,368
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stock. Therefore, the data of SSB obtained from ICES are used as a proxy
for recruitment R. Furthermore, the difference between SSB and total NEA
Mackerel landings (also obtained from ICES) is used as a proxy for escape-
ment S. Table 5.1 shows SSB and landings from year 1980 to 2013 as reported
by ICES as well as the difference between them, which is the escapement.
The parameters a and b in Equation 5.1.2 are estimated using data from
Table 5.1 after the time lag as well as transformation for variables R and
S have been taken into account. The results of the regression are shown in
Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Results from fitting recruitment and escapement data on Ricker’s
function.
Constant (a = eln(a)) Slope (b) R¯2
1.76417 0.00012 .49
(0.00)1 (0.00)
1p-values in parentheses
As can be seen from Table 5.2 the estimates of parameter a and b are statis-
tically significant at 1% and equal to 1.76417 and 0.00012, respectively. The
adjusted R2 of the regression is 49%.
Cost function
As discussed in Chapter 4 the cost function is derived as a function of re-
cruitment R and escapement S
TC(Rt, St) = c·ln
(
Rt
St
)
(5.1.3)
Due to the lack of information on total cost for NEA Mackerel harvest of
both players, we assume that the average unit cost of mackerel harvest for
both of the players is equal. We obtain data from profitability survey of the
Norwegian fishing fleet from year 2006 to 2013 (the Norwegian Directorate of
Fisheries) to calculate the average unit cost of harvest. The average unit cost
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Table 5.3: Operation costs and harvest in the licensed Norwegian purse seine
fishery as well as the deflation process.
Year Total cost Total harvest Average unit cost Index Deflated average unit cost
(million NOK) (000 tonnes) (NOK/kg) (2013=1) (NOK/kg)
2006 2,223 1,068 2.08 0.87 2.39
2007 2,489 1,150 2.16 0.86 2.51
2008 2,669 1,100 2.43 0.81 3.00
2009 2,580 1,077 2.40 0.86 2.79
2010 2,867 1,061 2.70 0.95 2.84
2011 3,186 845 3.77 0.95 3.97
2012 2,765 791 3.49 0.85 4.11
2013 2,533 695 3.65 1 3.65
of harvest is calculated as the total operation costs of all licensed Norwegian
purse seiners in million NOK divided by their total harvest in thousand
tonnes. In order to get rid of the inflation effect, we convert the average unit
cost into real terms by deflating it with price index. We use year 2013 as the
base year and we deflate the cost by Norwegian Price Index of First Hand
Domestic Sales obtained from Statistics Norway.
Then, we multiply the deflated average unit cost of harvest by the harvest of
each player during those years in order to obtain their total costs. The harvest
of Player 1 and Player 2 is the Icelandic harvest and the aggregated harvest
of the EU, Norway and the Faroe Islands respectively, as reported from ICES
(ICES, 2014b). Please be reminded that the corresponding individual harvest
of Coastal States are presented in Table 1.5 in Chapter 1. Table 5.3 shows
operation costs and harvest in the licensed Norwegian purse seine fishery and
the average unit cost as well as the deflation process. Table 5.4 shows each
player mackerel harvest and its corresponding total cost. Also, the mackerel
harvest and total cost for both players are summed up in order to estimate
the cost parameter c for the cooperative scenario.
In order to proceed with the estimation of the cost parameters we need data
for recruitment and escapement for both players individually and aggregately.
For the cooperative scenario SSB is used as a proxy for total recruitment and
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Table 5.4: Harvests (in thousand tonnes) and total costs (in million NOK)
for both individual players and in aggregate.
Year
Player 1 Player 2 Combined
Harvest Cost Harvest Cost Harvest Cost
2006 4 8.78 412 856.80 416 865.59
2007 37 79.28 486 1,050.18 523 1,129.47
2008 112 272.85 438 1,065.46 551 1,338.31
2009 116 278.78 565 1,355.04 681 1,633.82
2010 121 326.72 677 1,827.58 798 2,154.30
2011 159 600.42 697 2,627.24 856 3,227.66
2012 149 520.99 643 2,244.08 792 2,765.07
2013 151 552.01 639 2,331.97 790 2,883.98
the difference between SSB and the total harvest of both players is used as
a proxy for total escapement. For the non-cooperative scenario recruitment
for each player Ri is calculated using the parameter θi that is defined in
Chapter 4 as the share of NEA Mackerel stock that only appears in the EEZ
of Player i. In the same Chapter, θ1 is estimated as 12.5%, meaning that
12.5% of total recruitment lies in in the EEZ of Player 1. Table 5.5 shows
the aggregated and individual recruitment and escapement levels.
Table 5.5: Recruitment and escapement levels (in thousand tonnes) for both
individual players and in aggregate.
Year
Player 1 Player 2 Combined
Recruitment Escapement Recruitment Escapement Recruitment Escapement
2006 283 279 1,980 1,568 2,263 1,846
2007 306 270 2,145 1,658 2,451 1,928
2008 380 268 2,659 2,221 3,039 2,488
2009 460 344 3,222 2,657 3,682 3,001
2010 496 375 3,473 2,796 3,969 3,171
2011 564 405 3,951 3,254 4,515 3,659
2012 523 373 3,658 3,015 4,181 3,388
2013 537 386 3,762 3,123 4,299 3,509
Table 5.6 shows the results from the regression of the total cost function
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under the cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios. As can be seen from
the results, all cost parameters are statistically significant at 1% and the
adjusted R2 for all three regressions are above 68%.
Table 5.6: Results from the regression of the total cost function.
Cooperative scenario Non-cooperative scenario
Player 1 Player 2
Slope (c)
9,365 1,316 7,777
(0.00)1 (0.00) (0.00)
R¯2 0.70 0.77 0.68
1p-values in parentheses
5.2 Results and discussion
Having estimated all of our parameters we are enabled to compute the op-
timal escapement levels for the cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios.
Here in this section, we first calculate MSY for the mackerel stock and then
present the results for both scenarios respectively.
MSY
As stated in Chapter 4, the MSY escapement level is when the growth of
mackerel stock is maximised, i.e., the first order derivative of the stock-
recruitment function is equal to 1, F ′(S) = 1. Based on the estimates of the
parameters a and b of Ricker’s stock-recruitment function, our steady-state
MSY escapement level is 2,188,000 tonnes, which grows to 2,968,000 tonnes
of recruitment, corresponding to 780,000 tonnes of harvest.
Cooperative scenario
For the cooperative scenario the optimal escapement level is derived by solv-
ing the Golden Rule, Equation 4.1.15, with respect to escapement S. Table
5.7 shows the parameters and the results for the cooperative scenario.
57
SNF Report No. 06/15
Table 5.7: Parameters and optimal solution for the cooperative scenario.
Symbol Description Result Unit Remark
Parameters:
r Discount rate 5%
a
Ricker’s function parameters
1.76417
see Table 5.2
b 0.00012
p Price 10 NOK/kg
c Cost parameter 9,365 see Table 5.6
Optimal solution:
R∗ Recruitment 3,251 Thousand tonnes
S∗ Escapement 2,483 Thousand tonnes
H∗ Harvest 768 Thousand tonnes
NPV Net present value 108,230 Million NOK
As can be seen from Table 5.7, for cooperative scenario, NPV is maximised
to approximately 108.2 billion NOK when the stock reaches steady-state. At
steady-state, optimal recruitment and escapement are 3,251,000 and 2,483,000
tonnes respectively, resulting in 768,000 tonnes harvest of NEA Mackerel.
Such results answer the first question of the research problem defined in
Chapter 2.
Table 5.8 summarises the comparison between the steady-state equilibria at
both MEY and MSY. As can be seen, under the steady-state equilibrium at
MEY, a small drop in the harvest results in relatively large increases in the
NPV, recruitment and escapement levels.
Table 5.8: Comparison between MEY and MSY. Note that the unit for all
recruitment, escapement and harvest is thousand tonnes; and for NPV is
million NOK.
NPV Harvest Recruitment Escapement
MEY 108,230 768 3,251 2,483
MSY 103,795 780 2,968 2,188
Difference 4,435 -12 283 295
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Table 5.9: Parameters for the non-cooperative scenario.
Result
Symbol Description Player 1 Player 2 Unit Remark
r Discount rate 5%
a
Ricker’s function parameters
1.76417
see Table 5.2
b 0.00012
p Price 10 NOK/kg
c Cost parameter 1,316 7,777 see Table 5.6
θ Recruitment share 12.5% 87.5%
Non-cooperative scenario
For the non-cooperative scenario, the optimal escapement level for both play-
ers will be determined after n periods by solving the Golden Rule for non-
cooperation, Equation 4.2.4, n times. Table 5.9 shows the parameters for the
non-cooperative scenario.
As discussed in Chapter 4, each player determines its optimal escapement
level S∗i given the escapement strategy of the other player. Assuming in the
initial time cycle, t = 0, Player 1 is to determine its optimal escapement level
first. That is to say, Player 1 has to arbitrarily assign a value to Player’s 2
escapement S2,0 at time zero t = 0, e.g., S2,0 = 1, 500, 000 tonnes. Player 1
maximises its NPV at t = 0 based on the escapement value of Player 2 it
assigns. In the next time cycle, t = 1, by implementing the strategy in the
previous time cycle, Player 1 signals Player 2 how much it harvested in the
previous cycle. Similar to what Player 1 did in the initial cycle, Player 2
maximises its NPV using the same strategy in the second cycle, t = 1. That
is, maximising its NPV based on the escapement of Player 1 in the previous
cycle. In the next time cycle, t = 2, Player 1 repeats what Player 2 did in
the previous cycle, t = 1. This process continues for n cycles until no player
can further increase or decrease its NPV. That is, the steady-state is reached
for both players.
In our case, such steady-state is reached after n = 3 time cycles. As Table
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5.10 shows, at steady-state, the NPV of each player is maximised and can no
longer change at approximately 19.3 billion NOK for Player 1 and 76.5 billion
NOK for Player 2, resulting in an aggregated NPV of 95.8 billion NOK. The
aggregated harvest for both players is 777,000 tonnes and consists of 211,000
and 566,000 tonnes for Player 1 and 2, respectively. Total recruitment and
escapement are 2,833,000 and 2,056,000 tonnes, respectively. Such results
address the second question of the research problem defined in Chapter 2.
Table 5.10: Results for the non-cooperative scenario. Note that the unit for
all escapement, recruitment and harvest is thousand tonnes; and for NPV is
million NOK.
Time Symbol Description Player 1 Player 2
t = 0
S∗i,t Escapement of player i at t 142 1,500
St Total escapement at t 1,642
Rt Total recruitment at t determined by F (S0) 2,379
R∗i,t Recruitment of player i determined by θi 297 2,082
H∗i,t Harvest of player i determined by R
∗
i,t − S∗i,0 155 582
Ht Total harvest at t 737
NPV1,t Player’s i NPV at t 12,190 68,611
t = 1
S∗i,t Escapement of player i at t 143 1,913
St Total escapement at t 2,056
Rt Total recruitment at t determined by F (S0) 2,833
R∗i,t Recruitment of player i determined by θi 354 2,479
H∗i,t Harvest of player i determined by R
∗
i,t − S∗i,0 211 566
Ht Total harvest at t 777
NPV1,t Player’s i NPV at t 19,283 76,502
t = 2
S∗i,t Escapement of player i at t 143 1,913
St Total escapement at t 2,056
Rt Total recruitment at t determined by F (S0) 2,833
R∗i,t Recruitment of player i determined by θi 354 2,479
H∗i,t Harvest of player i determined by R
∗
i,t − S∗i,0 211 566
Ht Total harvest at t 777
NPV1,t Player’s i NPV at t 19,283 76,512
As can be seen from Table 5.11, compared to the cooperative scenario, under
non-cooperative scenario the NPV is lower by approximately 11.4%, amount-
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ing 12.4 billion NOK. Yet, under non-cooperative scenario the harvest is
larger by 9,000 tonnes. At the same time, under non-cooperative scenario
the aggregated recruitment is lower by 12.9%, amounting 418,000 tonnes.
Table 5.11: Comparison between the cooperative and non-cooperative sce-
narios. Note that the unit for all recruitment, escapement and harvest is
thousand tonnes; and for NPV is million NOK.
NPV Harvest Recruitment Escapement
Cooperative 108,230 768 3,251 2,483
Non-cooperative1 95,795 777 2,833 2,056
Difference 12,435 -9 418 427
1The figures are the aggregate numbers for both Player 1 and Player 2.
Please note that, in order to solve the non-cooperative scenario we assume
that Player 1 starts first and determines its optimal escapement strategy by
assigning an arbitrary value to the escapement of Player 2. Then Player 2
maximises its own NPV based on the escapement that Player 1 yield in the
previous time cycle. Such process goes on until neither of the players can
further improve their own NPVs. If we assume that Player 2 starts first
and Player 1 follows, the steady-state for both players would yield the same
results. However, in the process of reaching the steady-state, the number of
time cycles and the corresponding results of each time cycle may be different.
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Chapter 6
Game theoretic analysis
Given the results under both cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios in
Chapter 5, we apply game theory as introduced in Chapter 3 to analyse if
and under what circumstances should Player 1, i.e., Iceland, join the coali-
tion of the EU, Norway and the Faroe Islands, that is, Player 2.
According to Table 5.11 the comparison made in Chapter 5, under coop-
erative scenario, NPV is maximised to approximately 108.2 billion NOK,
whereas in the non-cooperative scenario, the NPV of each player is max-
imised at approximately 19.3 billion NOK for Player 1 and 76.5 billion NOK
for Player 2, aggregating to 95.8 billion NOK, which is 12.4 billion NOK
lower than under cooperation. This satisfies the foundation for cooperation
because each player can potentially benefit more by cooperating than com-
peting with each other for NEA Mackerel.
To see exactly how much each player benefits from cooperation, the bene-
fit needs to be allocated between the players. As discussed in Chapter 3,
the methods we use to split the NPV are the egalitarian method, altruistic
method and Shapley value. Here, we present and analyse the NPV shar-
ing solution under each method. This chapter answers the third research
question as defined in Chapter 2.
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Table 6.1: NPV share arrangement under the egalitarian method. Note that
all NPVs are expressed in million NOK.
Participant
Non-cooperation Cooperation Difference
NPV NPV Portion Amount Percentage
Player 1 19,2831 54,115 50% 34,832 181%
Player 2 76,5121 54,115 50% -22,397 -29%
Total 95,795 108,2302 100% 12,435 11%
1Results obtained from the non-cooperative scenario, see Table 5.10.
2Results obtained from the cooperative scenario, see Table 5.7.
Egalitarian
Egalitarian method split the benefit, i.e., NPV under cooperation, equally
among the players. For our case, it is calculated as follows:
Player i share =
NPV under cooperation
Number of Players
=
108, 230
2
= 54, 115 million NOK
According to egalitarian method, both Player 1 and Player 2 share the NPV
equally and end with 54.1 billion NOK each. As can be seen from Table
6.1, Player 1 enjoys a huge financial improvement compared to its stand-
alone financial situation, at the expense of Player 2. If such benefit sharing
arrangement is implemented, then it is not Iceland who does not want to co-
operate but rather the coalition made up of the EU, Norway and the Faroe
Islands. Assuming this is true, then side payment made by Iceland to the
coalition can be adopted to keep the coalition cooperating with Iceland. In
the simplest case, i.e., only financial terms are taken into account, the min-
imum side payment from the pocket of Iceland is the payment to make the
coalition financially indifferent whether it joins the coalition or stands alone.
The maximum side payment Iceland is willing to pay is the payment that
results in indifferent financial situation for Iceland whether keep the coalition
or go by itself.
Nevertheless the egalitarian method does not truly capture the notion of fair-
ness because Coastal States vary with different sizes and populations. If we
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Table 6.2: NPV share arrangement under the “fairness” method as we de-
fined. Note that all NPVs are expressed in million NOK.
Participant
Non-cooperation Cooperation Difference
NPV NPV Portion Amount Percentage
Player 1 19,2831 27,058 25% 7,775 40%
Player 2 76,5121 81,172 75% 4,660 6%
Total 95,795 108,2302 100% 12,435 11%
1Results obtained from the non-cooperative scenario, see Table 5.10.
2Results obtained from the cooperative scenario, see Table 5.7.
define fairness as every country in this region that is entitled with the same
share of NEA Mackerel, then the results would be different.
Here we calculate the NPV share arrangement to approach “fairness” as we
defined above. Player 1 consists of one country, namely Iceland, and Player 2
is formed up of three countries (the EU and the Faroe Islands are treated as
two single countries), that is, the EU, Norway and the Faroe Islands. There-
fore, Player 2 should take three quarters of the NPV under the cooperative
scenario. The results are presented in Table 6.2.
As can be seen in the Table 6.2, under our “fairness” assumption both play-
ers enjoy a financial improvement compared to their stand-alone situations.
The rationality condition as discussed in Chapter 3 is satisfied. Therefore,
at least in financial terms, such cooperation can stand.
Altruistic
Under the altruistic method the share of each player is proportional to its
stand-alone NPV over the total sum of the non-cooperative NPVs of both
players. It can be calculated as follows:
Player i share = NPV under cooperation× Stand-alone NPV of Player i
Sum of stand-alone NPVs
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Substituting the results in Chapter 5 in the equation above, we obtain
Player 1 share = 108, 230 · 19, 283
(19, 283 + 76, 512)
= 21, 786 million NOK
Player 2 share = 108, 230 · 76, 512
(19, 283 + 76, 512)
= 86, 444 million NOK
According to the altruistic method, Player 1 and Player 2 end up with 21.8
and 86.4 billion NOK, respectively, with the same increase percentage. As
can be seen from Table 6.3 the rationality condition stands, and the founda-
tion of cooperation suffices.
Table 6.3: NPV share arrangement under the altruistic method. Note that
all NPVs are expressed in million NOK.
Participant
Non-cooperation Cooperation Difference
NPV NPV Portion Amount Percentage
Player 1 19,2831 21,786 20% 2,503 13%
Player 2 76,5121 86,444 80% 9,932 13%
Total 95,795 108,2302 100% 12,435 11%
1Results obtained from the non-cooperative scenario, see Table 5.10.
2Results obtained from the cooperative scenario, see Table 5.7.
Shapley Value
The Shapley value was introduced by Lloyd Shapley in 1953 as a method that
allows each player to prior assess the benefits it would expect from playing
a game. Such value assigns player i the average of the marginal benefits
it could achieve when entering all possible coalitions (Roth and Verrecchia,
1979). The general form of the Shapley value is formulated as follows:
ui =
∑
M⊆N
(|N | − |M |)!(|M | − 1)!
|N |! × [ν(M)− ν(M − {i})] ∀ i < N
where N is the set of players, N = {1, 2} and M is a subset of N defining
all possible coalitions, M = {{1}, {2}, {1, 2}}. Symbol | · | stands for the
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number of players in a coalition, e.g., |M = {2}| = 1 but |M = {1, 2}| = 2.
Function ν(M) describes the total benefit to the coalition M , that is, the
NPV of players standing alone or cooperating; ν(M − {i}) is the benefit of
the coalition M without player i, e.g., ν({1, 2}− {1}) = ν({2}) and ν({1}−
{1}) = ν(∅) = 0. The calculation of Shapley values for Player 1 and Player
2 are:
u1 =
(|{1, 2}| − |{1}|)!(|{1}| − 1)!
|{1, 2}|! × [ν({1})− ν({1} − {1})]
+
(|{1, 2}| − |{1, 2}|)!(|{1, 2}| − 1)!
|{1, 2}|! × [ν({1, 2})− ν({1, 2} − {1})]
=
(2− 1)! · (1− 1)!
2!
×[ν({1})− ν(∅)] + (2− 2)! · (2− 1)!
2!
×[ν({1, 2})− ν({2})]
=
(2− 1)! · (1− 1)!
2!
×NPV1 + (2− 2)! · (2− 1)!
2!
×(NPV −NPV2)
=
1!·0!
2!
×19, 283 + 0!·1!
2!
×(108, 230− 76, 512) = 25, 500.5 million NOK
u2 =
(|{1, 2}| − |{2}|)!(|{2}| − 1)!
|{1, 2}|! × [ν({2})− ν({2} − {2})]
+
(|{1, 2}| − |{1, 2}|)!(|{1, 2}| − 1)!
|{1, 2}|! × [ν({1, 2})− ν({1, 2} − {2})]
=
(2− 1)! · (1− 1)!
2!
×[ν({2})− ν(∅)] + (2− 2)! · (2− 1)!
2!
×[ν({1, 2})− ν({1})]
=
(2− 1)! · (1− 1)!
2!
×NPV2 + (2− 2)! · (2− 1)!
2!
×(NPV −NPV1)
=
1!·0!
2!
×76, 512 + 0!·1!
2!
×(108, 230− 19, 283) = 82, 729.5 million NOK
According to Shapley value, Player 1 and Player 2 end up with 25.5 and 82.7
billion NOK, respectively, with the same NPV increase. As can be seen from
Table 6.4 the rationality condition stands, therefore players have incentives
to cooperate.
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Table 6.4: NPV share arrangement under Shapley value. Note that all NPVs
are expressed in million NOK.
Participant
Non-cooperation Cooperation Difference
NPV NPV Portion Amount Percentage
Player 1 19,2831 25,500.5 24% 6,217.5 32%
Player 2 76,5121 82,729.5 76% 6,217.5 8%
Total 95,795 108,2302 100% 12,435 11%
1Results obtained from the non-cooperative scenario, see Table 5.10.
2Results obtained from the cooperative scenario, see Table 5.7.
Table 6.5: Summary of NPV arrangement under different methods. Note
that all NPVs are expressed in million NOK.
Participant
Non-cooperation Cooperation
Egalitarian
Altruistic Shapley value
by participants by countries
Player 1 19,283 54,115 27,058 21,786 25,501.5
Player 2 76,512 54,115 81,172 86,444 82,729.5
Total 95,795 108,230 108,230 108,230 108,230
Table 6.5 summarises the results for the four different NPV arrangement
methods. Except for the egalitarian method by participants (Player 1 and
Player 2 share the NPV under cooperation equally), all the other three meth-
ods satisfy the rationality condition, so that they provide the necessary foun-
dation for cooperation between Player 1 and Player 2. According to the re-
sults the egalitarian method by countries is the most desirable method for
Player 1, with Iceland ending up with 27.1 billion NOK; while the altruistic
method is the most preferable method for Player 2, with the three-coastal-
state coalition taking 86.4 billion NOK. The results for Shapley value fall
in the middle of the two methods discussed above. In reality, all the NPV
arrangement methods for cooperation adopted in the thesis provide numer-
ical guidance for interest parties to negotiate. However, the negotiations
are also subject to other realistic constraints, for example how the national
population relies on one’s fishery economy.
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Chapter 7
Sensitivity analysis
In Chapter 5, we give estimates to the parameters of the bioeconomic model.
For some parameters, the process of making estimates are constrained by
data availability such as the share of recruitment of player i, θi, and the cost
parameter c and the price p. In this chapter, we vary parameter θ and c to
see how the model influences our results (as said before, for simplicity we
keep assuming p as a constant at 10 NOK/kg). The sensitivity analysis for
θ1 (θ2 = 1− θ1) and c are as follows.
Parameter θ
Parameter θ only affects the results in Chapter 5 under the non-cooperative
scenario. Table 7.1 shows how sensitive the NPV, recruitment, escapement
and harvest to the change of θ for both players and the aggregated total.
Please note that every time θ changes, it affects the cost parameter ci of each
player. This is due to the reason that in order to estimate the individual
cost parameters, θ is taken into account. For detailed explanation, please see
Chapter 5. Also, because of this effect that the variation of θ brings to the
cost parameters, when θ1 is zero, the results are different from the results
under cooperation. As under the cooperative scenario, we incorporate the
cost parameter c1 of Player 1 (dependent on θ1 = 12.5%) into calculation.
To some extent, when θ1 is zero, such situation is similar to the situation
when Iceland had not harvested mackerels before year 2006. Also, this situ-
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Table 7.1: Sensitivity analysis for parameter θ1. Note that the unit for all
recruitment, escapement and harvest is thousand tonnes; and for NPV is
million NOK.
θ1 Participant NPV Recruitment Escapement Harvest
0%
Player 1 - - - -
Player 2 110,072 3,235 2,465 769
Total 110,072 3,235 2,465 769
12.5%1
Player 1 19,283 354 143 211
Player 2 76,512 2,479 1,913 566
Total 95,795 2,833 2,056 777
15.0%
Player 1 20,611 413 179 234
Player 2 71,881 2,341 1,801 540
Total 92,492 2,754 1,980 774
20.0%
Player 1 22,119 520 255 265
Player 2 64,021 2,080 1,583 497
Total 86,140 2,600 1,838 762
25.0%
Player 1 22,379 615 334 281
Player 2 57,951 1,845 1,379 466
Total 80,330 2,460 1,713 747
30.0%
Player 1 21,884 702 418 284
Player 2 53,459 1,639 1,192 447
Total 75,343 2,341 1,610 731
35.0%
Player 1 21,107 787 506 281
Player 2 50,288 1,461 1,026 435
Total 71,394 2,248 1,532 716
40.0%
Player 1 20,399 873 598 275
Player 2 48,199 1,309 879 430
Total 68,597 2,182 1,477 705
1 Initial results obtained from Chapter 5, see Table 5.10.
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Table 7.2: Comparison between the non-cooperative scenario where θ1 is
equal to zero and the cooperative scenario. Note that the unit for all recruit-
ment, escapement and harvest is thousand tonnes; and for NPV is million
NOK.
Scenario NPV Recruitment Escapement Harvest
Non-cooperative (θ1 = 0) 110,072 3,235 2,465 769
Cooperative 108,230 3,251 2,483 768
Difference 1,842 -16 - 18 1
ation would mimic the situation where Player 2 excluded Player 1 from the
consultation rounds.
As can be seen from Table 7.2, under the non-cooperative scenario where θ1
is equal to zero, there is some improvement of NPV while maintaining rela-
tively stable levels of recruitment, escapement and harvest. The NPV under
the non-cooperative scenario where θ1 is equal to zero is 1.8 billion NOK
higher than under the cooperative scenario. Comparing the situation under
the non-cooperative scenario where θ1 is equal to zero to the non-cooperative
scenario where θ1 is equal to 12.5%, that is, the default stand alone cases for
both Player 1 and Player 2, side payment can be introduced to make Iceland
financially indifferent or even with some incentive not to catch any mackerel
until to the point that the indifferent financial situation is reached for the
coalition. The side payment ranges from 19.3 to 33.6 (110.1 - 76.5) billion
NOK. The upper limit of 33.6 billion NOK side payment represents the most
financial gain Iceland could achieve to bargain with the coalition in theory.
As a holistic sensitivity analysis, it can be seen from from Table 7.1, under
non-cooperative scenario as θ increases, the general trend is that all of the
total NPV, recruitment, escapement and harvest decrease. However, until
θ1 reaches approximately 25%, the NPV and harvest of Player 1 increases;
then, it decreases. That is to say that Iceland peaks its NPV and harvest
with a θ approximately equal to 25%. For the recruitment and escapement,
as θ1 becomes larger Player 1 enjoys an increasing share of those two. For
Player 2, for all the NPV, recruitment, escapement and harvest the trend for
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its share is to descend as θ1 increases.
Parameter θ1 represents the share of NEA Mackerel that shows up in Ice-
landic EEZ. Due to climate change, θ1 is anticipated to become larger as
more and more mackerels go to Icelandic waters to feed. From the figures
presented in Table 7.1, it can be implied that Iceland benefits most with 25%
presence of NEA Mackerel stock in Icelandic waters both financially and in
terms of physical catches. In all cases, as the share of NEA Mackerel for
Iceland grows, the loss of the three-coastal-state coalition keeps increasing
and the size of the stock continues decreasing. A strong incentive for the
three-coastal-state coalition to cooperate with Iceland can be inferred.
If we do not constrain Player 1 only to Iceland, the trend depicted in Ta-
ble 7.1 could also suit for countries which are more located in the north,
such as Greenland and the Faroe Islands, or any coalition consisting of any
partnership between Greenland, the Faroe Islands and Iceland.
Cost parameter
Cost parameter affects the results in Chapter 5 for both cooperative and
non-cooperative scenarios. As a unit cost per effort, parameter c is obtained
by treating historical cost data. It is based on the assumption that the aver-
age unit cost, for both Player 1 and Player 2 whether acting individually or
collectively, is equal. Such average unit cost is calculated using data of the
Norwegian purse seiner fishery, which has the lowest cost per unit of harvest
compared to the Scottish and Icelandic fleets (Lappo, 2013). However, the
likelihood for the real cost parameter being greater than the estimate we
currently use is much higher than it being smaller. Therefore, we stage more
cases of a higher cost parameter in our sensitivity analysis.
Table 7.3 and Table 7.4 show how sensitive the NPV, recruitment, escape-
ment and harvest is to the change of the cost parameter under the cooperative
and non-cooperative scenarios, respectively.
As can be seen from Table 7.3, as cost parameter c increases, NPV and har-
vest decrease. In contrast, recruitment and escapement level increases. This
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implies that higher cost conserve the fish resource.
Table 7.3: Sensitivity analysis for cost parameter c under cooperation. Note
that the unit for all recruitment, escapement and harvest is thousand tonnes;
and for NPV is million NOK.
Change c NPV Recruitment Escapement Harvest
-25% 7,024 120,999 3,140 2,364 776
-1 9,365 108,230 3,251 2,483 768
+25% 11,706 96,075 3,359 2,603 756
+50% 14,048 84,558 3,465 2,725 740
+75% 16,389 73,692 3,568 2,848 720
+100% 18,730 63,491 3,670 2,973 697
+200% 28,095 29,710 4,053 3,496 557
1Initial results obtained from Chapter 5, see Table 5.7
As can be seen from Table 7.4, as cost parameter ci increases, similar to
the cooperative case, NPV decreases. In contrast, again, recruitment and
escapement level increase. The harvest has seen an increase and peaks at
around 25% cost increase, then it decreases. The share of individual players
follow the same trend as the aggregated figures except for the harvest. The
harvest for Player 1 decreases all the way as the cost parameter increases.
However, the harvest for Player 2 increases first until around 75% increase
of the cost parameter, then it decreases. Nevertheless, once again, it can be
implied from the figures that higher cost conserve mackerel resources.
In comparing the cooperative scenario with the non-cooperative scenario,
all cases except the 200% increase, the collective NPV under cooperation
is larger than the aggregated individual NPV under non-cooperation. How-
ever, such trend reversed after the increase reaches 100%, e.g., when the in-
crease is at 200%, the collective NPV under cooperation (29.7 billion NOK)
is smaller than the aggregated individual NPV under non-cooperation (30.9
billion NOK).
72
SNF Report No. 06/15
Table 7.4: Sensitivity analysis for cost parameter ci under non-cooperation.
Note that the unit for all recruitment, escapement and harvest is thousand
tonnes; and for NPV is million NOK.
Change Participant ci NPV Recruitment Escapement Harvest
-25%
Player 1 987 24,189 335 109 226
Player 2 5,833 81,671 2,345 1,802 543
Total 105,860 2,680 1,911 769
-1
Player 1 1,316 19,283 354 143 211
Player 2 7,777 76,512 2,479 1,913 566
Total 95,795 2,833 2,056 777
+25%
Player 1 1,645 15,417 373 176 197
Player 2 9,721 70,835 2,611 2,028 583
Total 86,252 2,984 2,204 780
+50%
Player 1 1,974 12,280 391 209 182
Player 2 11,666 64,832 2,739 2,145 594
Total 77,112 3,130 2,354 776
+75%
Player 1 2,303 9,689 409 242 167
Player 2 13,610 58,655 2,863 2,264 599
Total 68,343 3,272 2,506 766
+100%
Player 1 2,632 7,529 426 274 152
Player 2 15,554 52,428 2,982 2,385 597
Total 59,957 3,408 2,659 749
+200%
Player 1 3,948 1,989 488 401 87
Player 2 23,331 28,879 3,416 2,881 535
Total 30,868 3,904 3,282 622
1Initial results obtained from Chapter 5, see Table 5.10
73
SNF Report No. 06/15
Chapter 8
Conclusion
In Chapter 5, we present the results for both cooperative and non-cooperative
scenarios by solving the bioeconomic model. In Chapter 6, various game
theoretic allocation methods are applied to obtain the possible outcomes of
cooperation between Player 1 and Player 2. Since some of the parameters we
adopt are susceptible to change, therefore sensitivity analysis is performed
in Chapter 8.
The harvest level we obtain for the cooperative scenario in Chapter 5 is
768,000 tonnes, which is significantly lower than the recommendation given
by ICES, amounting to a range between 927,000 and 1,011,000 tonnes in
2014 (831,000 - 906,000 tonnes in 2015) (ICES, 2014b). Also, it is even lower
than the 5-year arrangement agreed by the EU, Norway and the Faroe Is-
lands in 2014 (please see Table 1.3). The discrepancy between our results
and the ICES recommendation could be resulting from the various simplistic
assumptions we make as well as data in-availability. However, such assump-
tions are discussed extensively throughout the thesis so that the limitations
of our model can be inferred by the reader.
The NPV, recruitment and escapement levels associating with the harvest
level mentioned above under the cooperative scenario are 108.2 billion NOK,
3,251,000 tonnes and 2,483,000 tonnes respectively. Assuming in reality, what
Iceland and the three-coastal-state coalition are doing is exactly the same as
the non-cooperative scenario depicts in the thesis with exactly the same cor-
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responding figures (because we do not know the real numbers), then the
analysis in Chapter 5 tells us there is a 12.4 billion NOK financial gain and
418,000 tonnes increase in the stock size of Atlantic Mackerel under the coop-
erative scenario, creating the basis for the cooperation and sustainable use of
NEA Mackerel resource. Or we could even further postulate that what Ice-
land and the three-coastal-state coalition are doing in reality is sub-optimal
to the non-cooperative scenario in the thesis because the actual combined
harvest of the two players are much more than what we suggest under the
non-cooperative scenario. Therefore, the gain for cooperation should be at
least the same as the comparison made between the cooperative and non-
cooperative scenarios, and could well be much larger potentially.
Also, such comparison is based on the results under the assumption that
the share of mackerel stock appear in Icelandic waters is 12.5%. However,
with the projection of increase of the Icelandic mackerel share due to climate
change, the results are subject to change, experiencing first increasing but
later decreasing aggregated NPVs of the two players, as well as decreasing
aggregated recruitment and escapement levels of the NEA Mackerel stock.
It is worthy of noting that under the non-cooperative scenario, the results
are the most desirable for Iceland when about 25% of the mackerels present
in the EEZ of Iceland in a given year. Under such scenario, Iceland has the
most of its NPV and harvest among all the scenarios, amounting to approx-
imately 22.4 billion NOK and 281,000 tonnes, making the cooperation most
expensive to afford by the three-coastal-state coalition.
Furthermore, it should be noted that in the model we adopt itself, there are
limitations as well. For example, for both cooperative and non-cooperative
scenarios, the model is a bang-bang approach, that is, to deplete the mackerel
stock to the desired level in order to reach the steady-state as soon as possi-
ble. Yet, such approach is constrained in reality as there may not be sufficient
idle fishing capacity to employ. Furthermore, to maintain the steady-state,
sufficient fishing capacity is needed and subject to the same constraint in
reality. Therefore, it could become too expensive or infeasible to implement
such strategy as the model dictates.
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Nevertheless, we believe our model still serves as a simplistic guidance for re-
solving the Mackerel Dispute or any dispute for migratory pelagic fish stock.
In the foreseeable future, as the NEA gets warmer and warmer it can be
anticipated that Greenland might also get involved in this dispute of shar-
ing mackerel quotas with other Coastal States. Then such analysis can be
re-applied.
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This is an empirical analysis of the so-called Northeast Atlantic Mackerel Dispute 
between coastal nations such as the EU, Norway, the Faroe Islands and Iceland. In this 
thesis, firstly, we discuss the relevant biological and managerial aspects of Northeast 
Atlantic Mackerel. Then we begin to give a full factual depiction of the dispute. Based 
on the historical accounts of the dispute, we define the research problems of the issue. 
Further, we lay out the theoretical basis for solving such problems, i.e., fishery economics 
and game theory. By applying the theoretical framework and adopting the bioeconomic 
model, we solve the problems with extensive discussion and sensitivity analysis. The 
solution we find for the Mackerel Dispute is that all coastal nations should cooperate 
because such cooperation would lead to more NPV, recruitment and   escapement levels 
of the mackerel stock but less harvest collectively. However, only with a proper benefit 
sharing arrangement, such cooperation may be feasible, resulting in each individual 
player end up with more benefit than acting on its own. 
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